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THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONSENSUS:
DANGEROUS COMPROMISES OF THE FOOD
QUALITY PROTECTION ACT
FRANK B. CROSS*
In August 1996, President Clinton signed the Food Quality Protection Act
("FQPA"),' amending the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act ("FIFRA")2 and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA")
3
Amendments to the FFDCA removed pesticide residues on food from the
reach of the infamous Delaney Clause.4 In so doing, Congress enacted "one
of the most significant environmental and public health bills passed in 20
years, [which] indeed may distinguish itself in time as the most significant.",
5
The new FQPA contains many detailed provisions of potential import.
Perhaps the most striking and significant provision is the creation of a new
decision standard for regulation of risks to human health.6 This article
focuses on the new standard and its anticipated effects, with particular
attention to carcinogenic substances.7
The FQPA is the result of a compromise between two groups. One group,
the food industry, had long complained about the unreasonableness of the
existing Delaney Clause standard for pesticide residues in processed foods.
8
In response, various senators and representatives made periodic attempts to
modify the standard.9 The second group, environmental interests, publicly
* Professor of Business Regulation, University of Texas.
1. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 ("FQPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
2. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 -13 6 y
(1994).
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994). For a discussion of the Delaney Clause, see infra Part I.
5. Letter from Charles Benbrook, former director of the National Academy of Sciences
Agricultural Board, to California State Senator Mike Thompson (July 31, 1996) [hereinafter Benbrook
letter].
6. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has declared that this uniform decision standard
is the "most important aspect" of the statute. Notice to Manufacturers, Formulators, Producers, and
Registrants of Pesticide Products, Pesticide Registration (PR) Notice No. 97-1 (January 31, 1997).
7. The FQPA was passed largely to deal with problems of the Delaney Clause regulation of
carcinogenic pesticides. See infra Part II.A. Carcinogens present a particularly vexing regulatory
problem because they are presumed to have no safe threshold of exposure. Approximately 20% of
registered pesticides are suspected carcinogens. See Sandra 0. Archibald & Carl K. Winter, Pesticides
in Our Food: Assessing the Risks, in CHEMICALS IN THE HUMAN FOOD CHAIN 1, 12 (Carl K. Winter et
al. eds., 1990).
8. See Margaret Kriz, A Peace Treaty Over the Delaney Clause, NAT'L J., Aug. 3, 1996, at
1642.
9. Id. (observing that "[flarm-state members from both parties have long been keen to overturn
the 1958 Delaney Clause and its sweeping prohibition against food additives that contain even a trace
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adhered to the overly-protective Delaney Clause, but many of these groups
also appreciated the shortcomings of its standard. 10 Accordingly, these
groups indicated their willingness to abandon the Delaney Clause if they
received a substitute standard that they deemed sufficiently protective." As a
compromise, the agricultural interests evaded the application of the Delaney
Clause to pesticide residues, and the environmental groups obtained a highly
protective new standard.
12
Achieving such a compromise is generally regarded as a success,
evidence of the effectiveness of the democratic process, evincing the virtues
of moderation.' 3 However, the FQPA compromise was not universally
applauded. Some of the more adamant environmental groups were
disappointed to lose the application of the Delaney Clause. 14 Conversely, an
analyst for the conservative Competitive Enterprise Institute complained that
the new law was unreasonably tough and would preclude the application of
numerous pesticides.s Many believe these criticisms evidence the virtues of
the FQPA, reasoning that opposition from both ideological extremes signals
the quality of the legislation.
In this article, I take issue with such conventional wisdom that the FQPA
represents a significant policy advance. While compromise obviously has
some merit in disputes between competing public values, it is a poor policy
for fundamentally science-based matters. One does not try to establish the
origins of humanity by crafting some compromise between creationism and
evolution. Likewise, if the goal is to maximize protection of public health,
compromise between interest groups is unlikely to yield the best policy.
The central thesis of this article is that pesticide residues in food have
been and will continue to be overregulated. The FQPA may well exacerbate
the overregulation. While industry commonly laments compliance costs, the
true tragedy of such overregulation is found in its effects on public health. As
detailed below, patterns of pesticide regulation that persist in the FQPA will
likely be hazardous. Rather than compromise, wise policy requires a
fundamental rethinking of the need for regulation of pesticide residues.
Parts I and II of this article set forth the history of government regulation
of pesticides in food, and the new provisions of the FQPA. Part III examines
of cancer-causing agents").
10. See id. at 1644.
11. See id.
12. See id. (discussing the evolution of the compromise).
13. See id. at 1644 (reporting that "both sides won").
14. See id.
15. See Jonathan Tolman, The Real Pests Aren't in the Food, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1996, at
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the implications of new legislative requirements and observes how they may
perversely increase harm to overall public health.16 Part IV addresses how
such counterproductive effects might be evaded within the statute, but also
notes the limitations of such measures. Finally, in Part V, I propose a wiser
and more effective regulatory regime for pesticide residues on food.
I. THE DELANEY CLAUSE AND HISTORY OF PESTICIDE RESIDUE
REGULATION
Pesticide regulation has been tangled in overlapping dualism. Under
FIFRA, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") decides what
pesticides and uses are approved for registration in this country.17 For
example, the agency might register pesticide X for use on crop Y. The test for
such registration is functionally a cost-benefit balancing analysis.
Under the FFDCA, EPA regulates the pesticide residues that are allowed
on food products sold in interstate commerce. 18 Allowable levels are called
tolerances.' 9 The Act creates different standards for carcinogenic pesticide
residue tolerances in raw foods and processed foods.20 Tolerances in raw
foods were based on a type of cost-benefit balancing,21 but tolerance levels in
processed foods could not consider benefits from the pesticide's use.
Consequently, processed food tolerances seemed to fall under the Delaney
Clause.
The Delaney Clause amended the FFDCA in 1958 to prohibit the use of
16. This article assumes that the FQPA will be implemented as written. This may be a bit naive,
inasmuch as political influences can cause standards to be based on factors other than those dictated by
statute. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory ofRegulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211
(1976) (claiming that regulation is predictably influenced by extralegal political considerations). The
assumption is nonetheless reasonable. Surely it is fair to critique the statutory language, which will
inevitably influence implementation even if it is not rigorously obeyed. Moreover, empirical
investigation of pesticide regulations demonstrates the presence of political influence but also indicates
that basic legal commands are generally followed. See Maureen L. Cropper et al., The Determinants of
Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making, 100 J. POL. ECON. 175 (1992).
17. Pesticides must be registered under FIFRA before they can be sold or used in the United
States. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1994). EPA may deny any registration, but commonly registers the
product with some restrictions, such as labeling requirements. EPA bases its decision regarding
registration on consideration of risks to health or the environment, "taking into account the economic,
social, and environmental costs and benefits" of the pesticide's use. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb). Also, EPA
may suspend a previously issued registration if necessary to avert an imminent hazard. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 136d(c).
18. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1994).
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1994).
20. See21 U.S.C. §346a(1994).
21. The law provides that consideration of tolerances on raw foods shall include "the necessity
for the production of an adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply[.]" 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)
(1994).
1997] 1157
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any food additives in processed food that were found to induce cancer in
humans or animals.2 The Clause states that no additive can be considered
safe if "it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it
is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of
food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal."2
3
The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") was to implement the
Delaney Clause with respect to classic food additives (such as preservatives
or color additives) but EPA was charged with implementation for pesticide
residues in processed foods.24 The application of the Delaney Clause to
pesticide residues was neither universal nor straightforward. The law
effectively grandfathered the legality of any pesticides that had been
approved for use at the time of the Clause's passage.2 5 The Clause applied
only to processed foods, as residues on raw foods were regulated under a
cost-benefit balancing standard elsewhere in the Act.26 The amendment also
had a "flow-through" provision that limited Delaney's application. If
pesticides on raw foods, approved under the balancing test, simply flowed
through as the raw foods were constituents of processed foods, Delaney
would not apply.2 7 However, if the pesticide residue concentrated at all in the
processed foods to a higher level, the clause did apply.
28
The application of the Delaney Clause to concentration of pesticide
residues in processed foods had a significant backward effect. EPA adopted a
"coordination policy" to contribute some consistency to the wildly divergent
standards within the FFDCA.29 Under this policy, the Delaney Clause could
22. For a discussion of the Delaney Clause's legislative history, see Frederick H. Degnan & W.
Gary Flamm, Living with and Reforming the Delaney Clause, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 235, 237-39
(1995).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994).
24. EPA received these responsibilities through Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, eff. Dec. 2,
1970. 35 C.F.R. 15623, 84 Stat. 2086 (1970). A pesticide residue in processed food is treated as a food
additive subject to section 409. See, e.g., United States v. Ewig Bros., 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974).
25. The provisions having this effect are discussed in Douglas T. Sheehy, A De Minimis
Exception to the Delaney Clause: A Reassessment ofLes v. Reilly, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 257, 261
(1995).
26. See21 U.S.C. §346a(1994).
27. See21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1994).
28. The application of the flow-through provision was elaborated in regulations found at 40
C.F.R. § 180.1(0 (1993).
29. The nature of the coordination policy was explained in an EPA publication:
[l]t has been EPA's policy to revoke or refise to issue section 408 raw food tolerances or FIFRA
registrations for pesticide uses on foods that might become processed foods in cases where a
section 409 tolerance cannot be allowed. Largely because it is often difficult at the time a pesticide
is applied to predict whether the crop will be eaten raw or processed, EPA refuses otherwise
acceptable raw food tolerances if for some reason a food additive regulation cannot be issued for
residues of the pesticide in processed food.
Victor J. Kimm, The Delaney Clause Dilemma, 19 EPA J. 39,40 (1993).
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direct standards for residues on raw foods. If a pesticide residue concentrated
such that the agency would prohibit any section 409 tolerance under the
Clause, the agency would also deny any section 408 tolerance on raw foods,
regardless of any cost-benefit balancing.30 Hence, the possible concentration
of pesticide residues on concentrated foods effectively banned the pesticide's
application to all foods.
Perhaps the Delaney Clause was a reasonable response to scientific
understanding of the time, but it became a dubious regulatory approach.31
The problems of the Delaney Clause were two-fold. First, science discovered
potential carcinogenic effects of a large number of substances, at least where
laboratory animals were exposed to the Maximum Tolerated Dose (MTD),
an extremely high level of exposure.32 Second, scientific knowledge
advanced to where we could detect extremely minute amounts of a
substance. Rather than preventing significant exposures to a few very
hazardous substances, the Delaney Clause would preclude minuscule
exposures to a broad range of chemicals, even if that exposure produced little
or no actual harm.33
Recognizing these shortcomings, EPA sought to evade the application of
the Delaney Clause to pesticide residues.34 EPA responded to a National
Academy of Sciences report, discussed below, which concluded that rigid
application of Delaney could cause more harm than it prevented. In 1988,
EPA never formally adopted this policy as a rule. The policy was described in connection with
other rules. The agency expressed concern that the legality of a pesticide application in the field should
not turn on whether the food was ultimately processed, as this would create too much uncertainty. See
55 Fed. Reg. 17,560, 17,562 (1990).
30. The existence of this concentration effect is based on scientific data from processing studies.
See Carol S. Curme, Regulation of Pesticide Residues in Foods: Proposed Solutions to Current
Inadequacies Under FFDCA and FIFRA, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 609, 641 (1994).
31. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and Environment of the House Commerce
Comm. on the Food QualiO Protection Act of 1995, 104th Cong. 34-35 (1995) [hereinafter 1995
Hearings]. In those hearings, Carl Winter, Director of the Foodsafe Program of the University of
California, testifies:
Such an approach may have been prudent in 1958 when our detection capabilities and
understanding of the mechanisms of cancer were less developed. In 1995, however, our continued
enforcement of the Delaney Clause represents a scientific embarrassment which perpetuates
misinformation and increases consumer anxiety rather than providing meaningful public health
protection.
Id.
32. See infra Part rII.A. for discussion of the use of the MTD.
33. The developing shortcomings of the Delaney Clause are well summarized in Richard A.
Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or
Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13-21 (1988).
34. FDA, which was responsible for implementing the Delaney Clause with respect to most food
additives, likewise sought to evade the absolute strictures of its provisions. See Merrill, supra note 33,
at 21-33.
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EPA changed its historic interpretation of Delaney and issued a policy
statement that it would permit carcinogenic residues as long as the
consequent risk of cancer was no more than de minimis.35 The agency
defined the de minimis standard as a one in one million (1.0 x 10) risk of
cancer over a lifetime.36
EPA's efforts to evade the rigid application of the Delaney Clause
through a de minimis policy were promptly challenged in court. In Les v.
Reilly, the Ninth Circuit held that EPA's policy was illegal and set it aside.37
The court acknowledged the policy shortcomings of the original Delaney
approach but stressed that "[r]evising the existing statutory scheme" was not
EPA's or the court's responsibility; any change must come from Congress.
38
The parties to the action eventually settled, with EPA agreeing to reconsider
processed food tolerances for approximately sixty substances.39 Given the
failure of the administrative corrigent, attention turned to legislation.
The decision in Les v. Reilly was immediately threatening to growers.
Under the strict application of the Delaney Clause, EPA was forced to
prohibit a number of substances. Potato growers, for example, would lose the
two fungicides necessary to control "an epidemic of the potato blight that
caused the Irish potato famine of the last century." 40 Similar threats were
presented to growers of other products, including rice, peanuts, and
oranges.41 These prospective losses no doubt concentrated the attention of the
food industry, making it more amenable to the compromises found in the
FQPA.
In addition to the Ninth Circuit decision mandating the application of the
Delaney Clause, the FQPA provisions were provoked in large part by two
reports of the National Research Council of the National Academy of
35. See Regulation of Pesticides in Food: Addressing the Delaney Paradox Policy Statement, 53
Fed. Reg. 41,104 (1988). The FDA had earlier sought to apply a similar de minimis criterion under the
Delaney Clause. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
36. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 41, 107.
37. 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992). An earlier opinion on FDA regulation under the Delaney
Clause had reached a similar conclusion, that the Delaney Clause must be literally read. See Public
Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
38. 968 F.2d at 990.
39. See Delaney Clause Suit Sets EPA Timetable, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCHI) 40,684, at
41,050-51 (Feb. 10, 1995).
40. See 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 37 (statement of Leonard P. Giannessi of the National
Center for Food and Agricultural Policy).
41. See 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 38 (reporting that "[r]ice growers stand to lose the only
fungicide that is effective in controlling rice blast;" that peanut growers "would lose ... about $18
million of peanuts every year due to competition with weeds due to the use of less effective chemical
herbicides;" and that Florida citrus growers "would lose $14 million in oranges every year to a disease
that could not be controlled without a Delaney targeted fungicide").
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Sciences ("NAS"). The first of these was issued in 1987 and focused on the
practical effects of the Delaney Clause and inconsistent standards under the
FFDCA.42 The central theme of the report revolved around the fact that a
cost-benefit test was applied to the tolerance for residues on raw agricultural
commodities, while the Delaney Clause would bar any tolerance for residues
that concentrated in processed food. The NAS reported that it was "unable to
identify any sound scientific or policy reason for regulating pesticides present
in or on raw commodities differently than those present on processed
foods." 43
The problem with the inconsistent regulatory scheme, however, was not
limited to irrationality. The NAS observed that inconsistent standards could
increase the risk from pesticides. The NAS reported:
[s]uppose a registered pesticide X with known oncogenic effects and
an existing substitute Y which is a weaker oncogen are under review.
Both agents produce roughly equal benefits for comparable uses. X
does not concentrate in any processed apple products, but Y
concentrates marginally. The EPA could be forced by the Delaney
Clause to deny a section 409 tolerance for Y and also would be
compelled to cancel its section 408 tolerance and registration.
Pesticide X would claim a larger share of the market. Human cancer
risk would rise, not fall.44
The NAS also observed that the law would prohibit EPA from registering a
new, safer pesticide if that new pesticide had any carcinogenic effect and
concentration in processed foods. 45 The report characterized these perverse
effects from inconsistent standards as the Delaney Paradox.
The Delaney Paradox report was not wholly abstract and theoretical. The
NAS computed the effects of a consistent de minimis risk standard for both
sections 408 and 409. The report found that such a consistent standard would
reduce the overall risk from exposures to many specific pesticides more than
the present system, including the Delaney Clause.46
The second salient NAS report on pesticides examined the consequences
of pesticide residues on infants and children.47 This report concluded that
42. See COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC AND REGULATORY ISSUES UNDERLYING PESTICIDE USE
PATTERNS AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REGULATING
PESTICIDES IN FOOD: THE DELANEY PARADOX (1987) [hereinafter REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD].
43. Id. at40.
44. Id. at41-42.
45. See id. at 42.
46. Seeid. at 121.
47. COMM. ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, NATIONAL RESEARCH
1997] 1161
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prevailing methods of scientific risk analysis might systematically under-
estimate the risks of pesticides to infants and children, thereby causing
insufficient regulation of pesticide residues on foods. There were two reasons
for such incorrect estimates. First, there was relatively little data on food
consumption patterns of infants and children. As a result, there was a risk that
infants and children received higher exposures than anticipated.48 Second,
infants and children could have particular sensitivity to exposures to pesticide
residues. The report outlined a number of reasons to believe that this was the
case.4 9 This suggested applying an additional margin of safety to protect
infants and children from exposure to risk from pesticide residues on food.
The two NAS reports appeared to run in different directions. The first
report implied that the apparent harshness of the Delaney Clause was
counterproductive, counseling for the sort of de minimis standard that EPA
futilely sought to implement administratively. This apparently called for a
weakening of the standard. The second report suggested that prevailing
standards were insufficient for the protection of infants and children, calling
for a strengthening of standards. Rather than fostering a contradiction,
however, the two reports in effect provided a recipe for compromise.
50
II. THE NEW DECISION STANDARD---"REASONABLE CERTAINTY" OF
SAFETY WITH QUALIFICATIONS
Environmental laws aimed at protecting human health employ a wide
range of decision standards. Some are risk-based, such as those requiring
COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN (1993) [hereinafter PESTICIDES IN THE
DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN].
48. Children "consume notably more of certain foods relative to their body weight than do
adults" such that "their ingestion of pesticide residues on these foods may be proportionately higher
than that of adults." Id. at 323. Therefore "risk assessment methods that have traditionally been used
for adults may require modification when applied to infants and children." Id. at 323. See also Robin
M. Whyatt & William J. Nicholson, Conducting RiskAssessments for Preschoolers' Dietary Exposure
to Pesticides, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY: A HARVEST OF VIEWPOINTS 235, 235 (B.G.
Tweedy et al. eds., 1991) (noting that "[y]oung children generally receive greater exposure (in mg/kg
bw) than adults to pesticide residues in food due to higher caloric requirements and food intake rates").
49. The report was actually rather cautious in this claim. While noting that infants and children
might be especially susceptible to pesticide risk, the report conceded that "empirical evidence to
support this is mixed." PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, supra note 47, at 359. Id.
at 359. While claiming that for some pesticides, infants and children are at "greater risk than adults,"
the report also acknowledged that for other pesticides, infants and children might "exhibit less risk."
Id
50. See Charles Benbrook, Analysis of the Basic Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act Provisions of
H.. 1627, attachment to Benbrook letter, supra note 5 (saying the FQPA essentially "implement[s]
the major recommandations of the two NRC/NAS reports").
[VOL. 75:1155
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss3/2
1997] DANGEROUS COMPROMISES OF THE FQPA 1163
standards to ensure a "margin of safety" for public health.51 Some laws are
feasibility-based, mandating that pollution be kept as low as technologically
and economically feasible. 52 Still others are based on cost-benefit analysis,
proscribing "unreasonable risks. 53
Rather than embrace any of these extant standards, the FQPA adopted the
following decision rule: there must be reasonable certainty of no harm from
pesticide residues on food. While not commonly employed in environmental
regulation, the decision rule has been used for noncarcinogenic threshold
risks from food additives. This standard could well become "the health
standard adopted over the next decade or so in other federal environmental
and public health law."54 The Act's new standard is not inflexible: the FQPA
also contained some qualifications that theoretically could either increase or
decrease permissable tolerances. This section reviews the nature of the new
FQPA decision standard.
A. Defining the New Decision Standard
The FQPA directs the Administrator to allow a certain pesticide residue5
tolerance on foods upon a determination that the level is safe.56 "Safe" is
defined as "a reasonable certainty that no harm will result" from exposure. 7
EPA was to apply this standard not only to new pesticides but also to already
registered pesticides, reviewing them and setting new tolerances over the
next several years.58
51. See, e.g., Clean Air Act standards for criteria pollutants calling for an "adequate margin of
safety," 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994).
52. See. e.g., Clean Air Act standards for hazardous air pollutants relying on available
technology, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (1994); Clean Water Act standards for water toxics based on
technological feasibility, 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(A) (1994).
53. See, e.g., FIFRA standards for pesticides applying to substances that cause "unreasonable
adverse effects," 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(D) (1994).
54. Benbrook letter, supra note 5. Benbrook predicts this outcome for U.S. law and also notes
that other developed nations "are bound to eventually adopt the same or a similar standard for
pesticide residue exposures." Id.
55. A "pesticide residue" is newly defined as either a pesticide chemical itself or a substance that
results from the metabolism or degradation of a pesticide chemical. See Food Quality Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 402(a)(2XA), 110 Stat. 1489, 1513. The term does not include residues
attributable to natural causes or residues that the Administrator considers more appropriately regulated
under a different section of the Act. See § 402(a)(3)(A) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(q)(3)(A) (1997)).
56. For a good summary of the tolerance-setting process, see WILLIAM H. RODGERS,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 5.21(B) (1988). While this discussion predates the FQPA passage, the
procedures were not materially changed by that law.
57. Section 405(b)(2XA) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A) (1997)).
58. See Brian Broderick, Worries About Food Safety Law's Effect on Quick Approvals Aired at
Group Meeting, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), at d17 (Nov. 18, 1996) (discussing EPA's schedule for
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The new standard departs not only from the clear but arbitrary standard of
the Delaney Clause but also from the decision standard in most other
environmental laws. Given the lack of precedent for the decision rule, the
FQPA text leaves considerable ambiguity. Specifically, how much certainty
is required for reasonable certainty?
The House Report on the FQPA eliminates much of the textual
ambiguity. It indicates that tolerance for harmful pesticides with discernible
threshold effect should be a level at which the "aggregate exposure to the
pesticide chemical residue will be lower by an ample margin of safety than
the level at which the pesticide chemical residue will not cause or contribute
to any known or anticipated harm to public health. 59 In general, reasonable
certainty is the application of a hundred-fold safety factor to the "no
observable effect" level.60 The Committee emphasized the importance of the
hundred-fold safety standard when data must be extrapolated from animal
bioassays.6'
For the large number of pesticides regulated for cancer risk with no
definable threshold exposure,6a the no observable effect level is not helpful.
For these substances a reasonable certainty of no harm exists when "any
increase in lifetime risk, based on quantitative risk assessment using
conservative assumptions, will be no greater than 'negligible."' 63 Negligible
in turn is defined by the Committee's understanding of prevailing EPA
practice of considering a of one-in-one-million lifetime risk to be
negligible. 64 While the one-in-one-million level is often considered a
"consensus benchmark" for federal regulation,65 the level is extremely low
and quite cautious. One author observed that if the one-in-one-million
standard were universally applied "cooks could not cook (benzopyrene and
other indoor carcinogens), roads could not be paved (hot asphalt and
products of incomplete combustion), dentists could not X-ray (X-rays),
anesthesiologists could not anesthetise (halothane), and stone masons
(thorium), plumbers (lead, fumes), painters (solvents, epoxides), carpenters
reassessing all existing tolerances by August 2006).
59. H.R. REP. No. 104-669, pt. 2, at 41 (1996).
60. Id.
61. Seeid.
62. See Tina E. Levine, Assessment and Communication of Risks from Pesticide Residues in
Food, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 207, 210 (reporting that in the U.S. "all carcinogenic pesticides are
treated as nonthreshold").
63. H.R. REP. NO. 104-669, pt. 2, at 41 (1996).
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., David A. Wirth & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1857,
1864 (1995).
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(wood dusts) and farmers (UV from sunlight) could not work."66 In practice,
the one-in-one-million standard is not a trigger for regulation in other areas.
6 7
While Congress did not incorporate the one-n-one-million standard into
the text of the FQPA, the Report warns against any administrative effort to
apply a different standard for reasonable certainty of no harm. It provides that
if an Administrator seeks to change the definition of reasonable certainty,
"the new interpretation should be adopted by regulation and should be at
least equally protective of public health."68 Moreover, the Administrator is to
"bear the burden to demonstrate that the revised interpretation is equally
protective of the public."69 The legislative history thus makes quite clear that
reasonable certainty of no harm means a lifetime risk no greater than one in
one million, probably based on a conservative quantitative risk assessment
The FQPA creates an exception to its general "reasonable certainty"
standard for certain "eligible pesticide chemical residues." 70 In order to be
considered an eligible chemical residue for nonthreshold substances, the
Administrator must first determine that "the lifetime risk.., is appropriately
assessed by quantitative risk assessment."71 Once this relatively easy
threshold is crossed, the Administrator may permit a tolerance higher than
the one-in-one-million test if either of the following two conditions exist: (i)
the pesticide protects consumers from adverse effects that would create a
higher risk than that from exposure to the residue; or (ii) use of the pesticide
is necessary to "avoid a significant disruption in domestic production of an
adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply. '72 Even if one of these
two conditions is met, the law still imposes quantitative limits on the
agency's discretion. The "yearly risk" can be no more than "ten times" the
reasonable certainty standard (apparently one in one hundred thousand).
66. Paul Milvy, A General Guideline for Management of Risk from Carcinogens, 6 RISK
ANALYSIS 69,70 (1986).
67. See Dennis J. Paustenbach, A Survey of Health Risk Assessment, in THE RISK ASSESSMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 27, 94 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 1989) (citing C.C. Travis et al.,
Cancer Risk Management, 21 ENVTL. SCI & TECH. 415 (1987)) (noting that for risks to the entire
population, a risk level below one in one million never triggered action; however, a risk level above
three in ten thousand always triggered action"). Thus, in some contexts, agencies have accepted
residual risks of more than one in one million. See id; see also Frank B. Cross, Beyond Benzene:
Establishing Principles for a Significance Threshold on Regulatable Risks of Cancer, 35 EMORY L.J. 1
(1986) (reviewing varying standards for de minimis risk among federal agencies).
68. H.R. REP. No. 104-669, pt. 2, at 41 (1996).
69. Id.
70. Food Quality and Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 405 (b)(2)(B), 110 Stat.
1489.
71. Section 405(bX2)(]BXi)(1) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(i)(I) (1997)).
72. Section 405(b)(2)(BXiii) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(iii) (1997)). This
provision roughly traces the traditional balancing standard for tolerances in raw commodities but adds
the requirement of a "significant disruption." See id.
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Also, the lifetime risk can be no greater than twice that standard (apparently
one in five hundred thousand).73
The House Report again adds some clarity to the new provisions on
eligible residues. The first condition is designed to deal with situations where
"eating food treated with the pesticide chemical is safer for consumers than
eating the same food that is not treated with the pesticide." 74 An example
might be a fungicide that controlled food contamination from the known
carcinogenic fungus of aflatoxin.75
The Report also establishes some criteria for the second condition, which
allows higher tolerances to protect against a significant disruption of food
supply. In applying this condition, the Administrator "is expected to take into
account the availability and effectiveness of alternative pest control methods,
the impact of loss of the pesticide on crops, the impact of the national
availability and cost of food combined with the dietary impact of such loss,
and the impact on the ability of consumers to access a nutritious food
supply. ' 76 An FDA decision rendered in the 1980s to allow higher aflatoxin
exposure on corn and thus to "avoid widespread shortages of animal feed" is
presented as a "representative" example of the sort of significant disruption
envisioned by the second condition.77 These health considerations are
permitted only for evaluating existing tolerances, however, and are not for
use in establishing new tolerances.78
Both the exception conditions for eligible pesticide residues permit the
Administrator to establish higher tolerances than otherwise permitted. The
practical effect of the conditions is uncertain for reasons discussed below.
Significantly, even when an exceptional condition applies, there is a strict
tolerance ceiling that the Administrator may not evade. 9 With respect to this
ceiling, there is little room for consideration of pesticide benefits, even health
benefits.
B. Exposure ofInfants and Children
The FQPA added a provision to existing law in an attempt to ensure
73. See § 405(b)(2)(B)(iv) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(iv) (1997)).
74. H.R. REP. No. 104-669, pt. 2, at 42.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 42-43.
78. See Office of Pesticide Programs, Envt'l Protection Agency, Consideration of Pesticide
Benefits Under FQPA 1, 1 (last modified Oct. 9, 1996) <httpJ/www.epa.gov/opppspslfqpal
benefits.htm>.
79. See id.
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consideration of the unique exposure conditions and susceptibilities of
infants and children. This subsection directs the Administrator to consider the
risk of pesticide residues in light of particular consumption patterns and the
special susceptibility of infants and children, as well as unique cumulative
effects of common toxicity mechanisms on infants and children.80 Once these
factors have been considered, the Administrator must ensure to a reasonable
certainty that no harm will occur to infants and children and publish a
specific determination of this effect.81 Moreover, when information on
effects is incomplete for pesticides with threshold effects, the Administrator
must apply an additional factor of ten to the (otherwise hundredfold) margin
of safety for infants and children.82 The legislative history adds little to the
understanding of this new provision, save for a reference to the NAS report
on pesticide exposures of infants and children.83 In practice, EPA will
explicitly determine that a tolerance is safe for children, consider the need for
an additional safety factor of ten in order to account for uncertainty in the
data, and consider any special exposures or sensitivities children may have to
the pesticide in question.
84
In limited practice under the new law, the concern for children has not
had a material impact 85 EPA does not consider itself bound by its initial
tolerance setting,8 however, and the special consideration could potentially
cause a significant reduction in tolerances.
C. Cumulative Effects of Exposures and Common Toxicity Mechanisms
Another new provision found in the FQPA requires consideration of
80. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 408(b)(2)(C), 110 Stat. 1489,
1514. Within the special susceptibility criterion, the statutory text specifically references "neurological
differences between infants and children and adults, and effects of in utero exposure to pesticide
chemicals." Section 408(b)(2XCXi)(11) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(i)(1)
(1997)).
81. See § 408(b)(2)(CXii) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1997)).
82. See id.
83. See H.R. REP. No. 104-669, pt. 2, at 43.
84. PR Notice No. 97-1, supra note 6.
85. See, e.g.. 62 Fed. Reg. 1284, 1287 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180) (finding no
need for special consideration of infants and children given myclobutanil exposure levels); 62 Fed.
Reg. 1288, 1291-92 (1997) (tolerance for zinc phosphide requires no special consideration because no
evidence indicates special sensitivity); 62 Fed. Reg. 5333, 5335-36 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt.
180) (1997) (tolerance for glufosinate ammonium requires no special consideration for infants and
children); 62 Fed. Reg. 4911, 4914 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180) (1997) (tolerance for carboxin
requires no special consideration).
86. See 62 Fed. Reg. 5370, 5371 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180) (declaring that
"these early tolerance and exemption decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis and will not bind
EPA as it proceeds with further rulemaking and policy development').
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various factors in "establishing, modifying, leaving in effect, or revoking a
tolerance or exemption for a pesticide chemical residue."87 These factors
include "available information concerning the cumulative effects of such
residues and other substances that have a common mechanism of toxicity."88
A related factor is the information concerning "aggregate exposure levels of
consumers ... to the pesticide chemical residue and to other related
substances, including dietary exposure under the tolerance and all other
tolerances in effect for the pesticide chemical residue, and exposure from
other non-occupational sources."
89
The Act provides that EPA must aggregate total exposures from water,
residential, and lawn care uses with dietary exposures in setting a standard.
This provision seeks to prevent a large cumulation of small risks. The Act
also calls for cumulation of exposures from these pathways for different
pesticides that have a common mechanism of toxicity. Whole groups of
pesticides could therefore be grouped within a single tolerance.
The House Report adds nothing to the understanding of this new
provision, although the purpose of the provision seems clear. Environmental
groups observed that the seemingly protective one-in-one-million risk
standard was not so protective when consumers were exposed to that
standard in food residues, with additional exposure from other sources.
Suppose that the one-in-one-million standard were applied to ten different
crop uses ofpesticideX. A consumer who ate the maximum tolerated amount
of residue on each crop would therefore have a consequent risk of ten in one
million (one in one hundred thousand). The consumer might also be exposed
to pesticides in the water supply and other sources that could increase the risk
further. The consideration of "cumulative effects" and "aggregate exposure"
is intended to avoid increasing the risk level through multiple exposure
sources.
The application of the cumulative risk standard raises a host of significant
implementation questions. EPA could either require data that demonstrate a
common mode of action, use Structure Activity Relationships9" to group
87. Section 408(b)(2)(D) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(D) (1997)).
88. Section 408(b)(2)(D)(v) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(D)(v) (1997)). This
Section also requires consideration of other important factors. For example, the Administrator is to
consider the quality of the available scientific information on health effects from pesticide exposure.
See § 408(b)(2)(D)(i)-(iii) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(D)(i)-(iii) (1997)). The
Administrator also is to consider the existence of population groups with unusually high exposures or
susceptibility to pesticide residues. See § 408(b)(2)(D)(iv), (vii) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 346a(b)(2)(D)(iv) and (vii) (1997)).
89. Section 408(b)(2)(D)(vi) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(D)(vi) (1997)).
90. Structure Activity Relationships (SARs) compare the chemical structure of substances and
presume that relatively similar structures produce similar effects.
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chemicals, or group all chemicals with the same or similar endpoints (e.g.,
carcinogenicity at a particular body site, such as thyroid tumors in
experimental animals). The first approach would be the most precise and
restrictive, but EPA currently does not collect data for this determination and
doing so would be costly and time-consuming.91 The third approach would
be most precautionary, but would result in many false positives.92 EPA's
present intention is to combine the second and third approaches, grouping
chemicals that cause the same effect through the same pathway, as
determined through structural configurations.93
In December, 1996, EPA's Office of Prevention, Pesticides & Toxic
Substances ("OPPTS") adopted an "interim decision logic" for the
application of the FQPA pending final and formal risk assessment policies.94
The interim logic creates a screening model that assigns exposure levels to
different pathways and creates an overall "risk cup" of total risk exposure.95
Presumably, once the cup is full, meaning that exposures equal but do not
exceed the statutory threshold risk, the agency will not approve any more
uses of a pesticide. The logic also considers cumulation through common
mechanisms of toxicity. Many different pesticides are within the general
group known as organophosphates. To the extent that such pesticides have
the same mechanism of toxicity, the agency may group them for purposes of
tolerance setting, and may not permit overall exposures higher than the
tolerance level.
While the interim decision logic did not expressly apply to carcinogenic
pesticides, EPA has applied a similar procedure for these substances. The
cumulative effects standard was applied in the context of a petition for an
emergency time-limited tolerance for the pesticide lactofen. 96 EPA grouped
lactofen with four other related pesticides, in the category diphenyl ethers.
Given the absence of scientific information, EPA initially observed that it
91. See Office of Pesticide Programs, Envt'l Protection Agency, FQPA-Food Safety Advisory
Committee Risk Issues Subgroup Aggregate Exposure and Common Mode ofAction 2 (last modified
Oct. 9, 1996) <httpJI/www.epa.gov/opppsl/fqpa/riskiss.htm>.
92. See id.
93. See id. The adoption of this approach is not yet official. The agency has elsewhere stated that
if "a pesticide shares a common toxicological endpoint and structural similarity with other substances,
EPA will assume that a common mechanism of toxicity may exist." PR Notice 97-1, supra note 6. The
latter procedure appears similar to the third approach. Moreover, Don Barolo, the director of the OPP,
has said that EPA would "apply conservative assumptions to protect safety" in this determination. See
Brian Broderick, Determining Risks under FQPA Considered by EPA Advisory Group, Daily Env't
Rep., at d6 (Oct. 24, 1996).
94. See EPA Managers Approve Food Safety Law 'Interim Decision Logic', INSIDE EPA'S RISK
POL'Y REP., December 20, 1996, at 7, 7.
95. See id.
96. See 61 Fed. Reg. 65,395 (1996).
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was "premature to add the risk from these chemicals," but then deemed it
"prudent" to cumulate the risk under FQPA.97 The carcinogenic risk from
lactofen was estimated to be only 1.54 x 108, but other diphenyl ethers had a
risk as high as 1 x 10-5 for diclofop methyl. Because the risk for these other
diphenyl ethers is so high, the FQPA might appear to preclude any new
tolerances for diphenyl ethers. However, EPA observed that a lactofen's
contribution to aggregate cancer risk is insignificant compared to the other
diphenyl ethers.98 EPA also observed that risk estimate for diclofop methyl
and other ethers were based on exposures higher than those in the new
standard. Once anticipated residues and new cancer potency levels were
revised, "the projected risks will be much lower than 1 x 10-6 for all of these
chemicals."99 EPA finally noted that it, along with industry, was "developing
a methodology for determining whether or not multiple exposures will occur
and with what frequency for these and other chemicals."' 00 If such exposures
were infrequent, EPA suggested that it would be inappropriate to cumulate
the risks. 101
Lactofen provides an interesting example of the cumulative risk
provision. EPA permitted the tolerance in large part because the substance
"contributes insignificant chronic toxicity and carcinogenic risks as
compared to the other diphenyl ethers."' 1 2 It is not plain that this is a relevant
fact under the FQPA because the law's required cumulation was arguably
aimed at such small additional incremental risks. Perhaps EPA recognized
this fact and independently justified the tolerance on grounds that diphenyl
ethers presented a cumulative risk of less than 1 x 10-6. However, this
independent escape may be unavailable for more significant groups of
pesticides such as organophosphates.
Significantly, the cumulative effects of common toxicity mechanisms
permit some limited consideration of pesticide benefits. When the cumulative
residues of a group of pesticides threaten to exceed the standard, EPA may
use a benefits assessment to determine which applications within the risk cup
are the most beneficial. Then, if a new and valuable use comes along, EPA
may use benefits considerations to cancel existing uses in order to "make
room" for a new application. 0 3 This consideration is quite limited, however,
97. See id. at 65,399.
98. See id
99. Id at 65,400.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 65,398.
103. See Office of Pesticide Programs, supra note 78, at 2. EPA's authority in this matter is
somewhat limited by external realities. Pesticide manufacturers may withdraw or voluntarily cancel
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in that it applies only within a given risk cup.
D. The Exemption Process
Federal law has long provided for emergency exemptions to pesticide
residue regulations. The FQPA retains a strict exemption process for
pesticide tolerances. The Administrator can establish a new exemption or
leave an existing exemption in place only after determining that "the
exemption is safe" under the reasonable certainty of no harm test.'04 The
exemption process also incorporates the cumulative effects test; thus, a
determination to a reasonable certainty that no harm "will result from
aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue" is required. 10 5 This
aggregate exposure must include exposures even beyond those in the diet.'
0 6
Exemptions are also prohibited unless there is either a practical method for
measuring residues or a reason why such a method is not needed. 07 Prior to
the FQPA, EPA was not required to establish an exposure tolerance in
connection with an emergency exemption, but the new law directs EPA to
provide for a time-limited tolerance.108
The specific language of the exemption provision makes it appear quite
rigorous and difficult to satisfy. Industry representatives have cautioned that
the new exemption process threatens a "train wreck" and "crop disasters."'
09
EPA's Associate Assistant Administrator for OPPTS has declared that such
exemptions are "harder to achieve" under the new statute than under
preceding law." 0 Nevertheless, EPA has begun issuing and denying
emergency exemptions under the new authority"' even though final
regulations for such exemptions are at least months away. Producers tend to
seek exemptions for temporary applications of pesticides on crops for which
uses in order to make more room for their other products. See id. The application with the most
benefits is not necessarily the most profitable for the manufacturer. In practical effect, the
manufacturer can ultimately control which application is cancelled.
104. See Food Quality and Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 408(c)(2)(A), 110 Stat.
1489, 1514.
105. See 408(c)(2)(AXii) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1997)).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 104-669, pt. 2, at 45.
107. See § 408(c)(3) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(c)(3) (1997)).
108. See § 408(I)(6) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(1)(6) (1997)).
109. See Broderick, supra note 58 (quoting Rick Holt of DuPont Agricultural Products).
110. See Brian Broderick, EPA Announces new Section 18 Approvals, Holds Meeting on New
Law, Daily Env't Rep., at D5 (Nov. 22, 1996) (quoting Jim Aidala).
111. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 65,395 (1996)(lactofen); 61 Fed. Reg. 63,721 (1996) (triadimefon); 61
Fed. Reg. 58,135 (1996) (propioonazole). Exemptions were denied for requested uses of lactofen and
esfenvalerate based on dietary risk concerns. Office of Pesticide Programs, Envt'l Protection Agency,
Emergency Exemptions and the FQPA (last modified Sept. 25, 1996) <httpJI/www.epa.govlapppspslI
fqpa/r.
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the product is not yet registered. The exemptions are important in this context
but are seldom used to increase a tolerance level that has already been set.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW DECISION RULE
The FQPA was intended to lend coherence to the law regulating pesticide
residues in food, avoiding the Delaney Paradox, while still providing
additional protections, particularly to infants and children. This section
examines the likely consequences of the law. The short- and long-term
effects of the legislation seem apparent. After the FQPA's passage, EPA
withdrew a number of revocations and permitted continued applications 112 of
substances whose tolerances it had previously revoked after a federal court
ordered EPA to take the Delaney Clause literally."1
3
Over the long term, however, the FQPA is likely to reduce overall
pesticide usage. The former director of the NAS agricultural board, Charles
Benbrook, has estimated that "about two-thirds of the existing tolerances on
the books will be affected, and about one-half of these will be affected
significantly, i.e., lowered more than 10-fold."' "14 Thus the law is expected to
cause a considerable reduction in pesticide usage, but the health
consequences of this reduction are less clear.
Before projecting health consequences of the FQPA, some basic
understanding of the problem is required. Therefore, the initial subsection
below examines the nature of the public health risk posed by pesticide
residues. Then, in discussing the full implications of the statute, this section
presents some new and continued health paradoxes persisting under the
FQPA. These paradoxes prove that while the Delaney Clause was
theoretically indefensible, the compromises of the FQPA offer little or no
improvement.
A. Public Health Risks of Pesticide Residues
The central motivation behind the FQPA is its concern over the public
health risks due to exposure to pesticide residues. Any investigation of the
merits of that legislation must account for the nature of those risks.
Often assumptions are made without evidence. Some believe that the use
of various pesticides is routine or even universal within agriculture. Many
112. See id.
113. The effect of Les v. Reilly on proposed revocations is discussed in the notice at 61 Fed. Reg.
50,684 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 185) (discussing consent decree arising out of litigation
and consequent revocation of seventeen tolerances).
114. Benbrook, supra note 5.
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people fear that material residues of pesticides remain on produce that is not
labeled organic. In addition, there is a widespread concern that pesticides
may cause cancer or other ailments.115
In 1987, the NAS Delaney Paradox, in response to an EPA request for
risk assessment, report provoked considerable concern over the effects of
pesticide applications on public health.1 16 The Academy used the then
prevailing EPA tolerances for residues on foods and the conventional linear
risk assessment models developed by the agency to provide an estimate of
cancer risk.117 This produced a conservative estimate of what one might call
"legally-allowable risk." Estimating an individual's risk from seventy years
of exposure to the maximum allowable exposure of twenty-eight
carcinogenic pesticides yielded a total risk of about six in one thousand 18
This level is extremely high for environmental risks of cancer and could
imply that exposure to pesticide residues caused tens of thousands of cancer
cases annually.
By design, the NAS study was a measure of maximum legally allowable
risk, not actual measured risk, 9 but this distinction was readily
overlooked.120 Many Americans believe that industry will pollute in an
amount up to and perhaps exceeding that allowed by law. While this
assumption may have some merit in circumstances involving air and water
pollution, it is extremely inaccurate in the case of pesticides. Scrutiny of the
115. See, e.g., Carl K. Winter, Pesticide Tolerances and Their Relevance as Safety Standards, 15
REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 137, 137 (1992) (reporting that "80% of American Shoppers
consider pesticide residues to be a major concern").
116. See REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD, supra note 42.
117. See Archibald & Winter, supra note 7, at 26-27 (summarizing the NAS study).
118. See id. at27.
119. See id. (referring to the NAS estimate as one of "legally allowable risk"). This is not a
measure of actual risk, as the NAS explains:
The EPA traditionally has estimated dietary exposure conservatively by incorporating worst-
case assumptions. Pesticide residues are assumed to be present in foods at the published tolerance
level. The agency also generally assumes that 100 percent of the acreage of a crop that could be
treated with a pesticide will be treated. Estimating exposure in this way nearly always produces an
overestimate of actual dietary exposure....
REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD, supra note 42, at 59. The agency itself refers to its calculation as
the Theoretical Maximum Residue Contribution ("'TMRC") and "has acknowledged for a long time the
shortcomings of this method." Id. at 60. See also Winter, supra note 115, at 141 (noting that the
TMRC calculation assumes that "100% of the crops that may be legally treated with a pesticide are in
fact treated and that residues are always present at the tolerance levels").
120. See Winter, supra note 115, at 149 (observing that "this mathematical construct has often
been improperly substated as an indicator of actual pesticide exposure"); Leonard P. Gianessi, Use of
Pesticides in the United States, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 48, at 24, 25
(noting that NAS used "totally unrealistic assumption" of maximum allowable risk). The presumption
that producers "blindly ... use prophylactic spraying of all recommended pesticides every year" is a
"simplistic straw man." Id at 27.
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facts relating to exposure indicates that health concerns about pesticide
residues are substantially overblown.
In some contexts, industry resists pollution control measures because such
technologies can have considerable cost. For pesticides, however, it is the
chemicals themselves that cost money, so agricultural producers have a
financial incentive to use as little as possible. The NAS reports that farmers
spent about five billion dollars on pesticides in 1984.121 In this context,
producers have a financial incentive to minimize their pesticide usage
independent of government regulation.
The use of "legally allowable risk" in risk estimation inevitably leads to
"a substantial upward bias in risk estimates."'122 Data are available to
demonstrate the magnitude of the upward bias. For example, twelve different
pesticides may be used in growing tomatoes. Data from California reveal that
the most commonly used of these pesticides is applied to only 26.42% of the
tomato crop in the state. 123 The pesticide of median use was applied to only
about four percent of the crop. 24 Fifty-four insecticides were approved for
use on tomatoes, yet no California grower used more than five insecticides at
a time, and most growers used either one or zero insecticides.
125
Obviously, pesticides are employed much less than legally allowed, and
in the case of tomatoes, the upward bias from this factor alone is about
twenty-five fold. Tomatoes are not unique; similar results were found for
other crops, including apples, lettuce, and oranges. 126 Although authorized by
the government, many pesticides often are not applied.12
1
Furthermore, even when pesticides are applied in the field, they do not
necessarily remain present on the harvested crop. Residues in the field may
volatilize into the air, be removed by water, degrade from sunlight and other
121. See REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD, supra note 42, at 49. While this represented only 4%
of all production costs for all of agriculture, id., the percentage could be much higher for individual
farms that use the chemicals. As discussed below, many producers require little or no pesticide use.
122. Archibald & Winter, supra note 7, at 35.
123. Id. at 37 tbl. 1-9.
124. See id
125. See Winter, supra note 115, at 143-44 (citing C.F. CHAISSON ET AL., PESTICIDES IN OUR
FOOD: FACTS, ISSUES, DEBATES AND PERCEPTIONS (1987)); see also Gianessi, supra note 120, at 25
(noting that "only about one-half of the nation's wheat acreage is treated with any pesticides at all-
usually just a single herbicide").
126. See Gianessi, supra note 120, at 25. The other crops have at least one pesticide that is used
more broadly on virtually all planted acres. However, a considerable number of permitted pesticides
are used on less than one percent of the acreage. See id.
127. The FQPA recognizes this fact and allows tolerances to be adjusted according to the percent
of food actually treated. Section 408(b)C2)(F) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(F)
(1997)). This adjustment may be used, however, only when reliable data are available for the specific
application, exposure data are not underestimated for any significant subpopulation, and exposure is
not higher in a particular area. See id.
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factors, or dissipate as the product grows.128 Given enough time, residues will
inevitably approach zero.' 29 In some cases, pesticides are applied to the soil
and are not even absorbed by the plants grown. 130 Thus, pesticides are not so
ineluctably persistent as may be presumed.
Evidence demonstrates that the pesticide residues resulting even from
treated acreage tend to be much lower than the tolerances. Again according
to California data,' 3 ' some crops with permitted pesticides such as bananas
and beans had zero residue on all tested produce. 32 For many other crops,
only a small percentage of the tested produce had any positive residues. 33
For these crops on which residues were found, within a majority of samples
(celery, peaches, strawberries, sweet potatoes), the levels of those residues
were typically less than 10% of the maximum allowable residue.
134
Such low residue levels are not unique to California. An FDA study
found a very low percent of samples had positive residue detections.13 Other
studies confirm these results.136 A 1988 joint sampling by EPA and the
National Food Processors Association found that 81% of sampled products
had no detectable residues.137 Moreover, sampling procedures may be
skewed to overstate the presence of residues, so true public exposure levels
are lower than the low estimates yielded by residue analysis.'38  Even
128. See PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, supra note 47, at 206 (discussing
these and other mechanisms through which residues dissipate).
129. Id. at 207. See COMM. ON COMPARATIVE TOXICITY OF NATURALLY OCCURRING
CARCINOGENS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CARCINOGENS AND ANTICARCINOGENS IN THE
HUMAN DIET 246 (1996) [hereinafter CARCINOGENS AND ANTICARCINOGENS IN THE HUMAN DIET]
(noting that pesticide residues depend on various factors, including "the time between pesticide
application, harvest, and sampling; and the degree of postharvest processing'). Moreover, washing,
blanching, and canning all reduce pesticide levels. See id.
130. See PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, supra note 47, at 227.
131. California has by far the most extensive monitoring program for food pesticide residues. See
id. at 220.
132. See Archibald & Winter, supra note 7, at 42.
133. See id. The percentages of positive residues for various common crops were as follows:
apples (10.48%); broccoli (4.62%); grapes (20.62%); onions (I 1.88%); potatoes (9.17%); and spinach
(24.03%). See id.
134. See id.
135. See PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, supra note 47, at 244-45. The
median number of positives found for several dozen pesticides was less than five percent. Id. When
detected the residues were typically at levels well below the EPA tolerance. See id. at 256.
136. See Winter, supra note 115, at 143 (reporting that "residue monitoring data for the past
several years have consistently shown that residue levels rarely approach or exceed tolerance levels
and that residues have not been detected in the majority of samples analyzed").
137. See PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, supra note 47, at 221. More
recent sampling have found even lower levels of residues. See id. at 222 (saying a National Food
Professors Association study from 1988-93 found residues on 97.5% of all samples to be below limits
of quantification).
138. See id. at 226 (noting that "[s]ampling may be biased to seek positive results when
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controlled field studies may overstate actual residues, as demonstrated by the
following table, which displays tolerances (in ppm), anticipated residues
based on field studies, and the maximum actual observed residue levels for a
major pesticide (captan) in the state of California.139
TABLE 1
Summary of Captan Residue Data
Commodity Tolerance Field Study Maximum Observed
Almonds 2 0.14 <0.01
Apricots 50 4.98 5.0
Cherries 100 18.59 20.0
Nectarines 50 2.17 <0.01
Peaches 50 6.59 10.0
The highest residue levels actually observed are often much less than
those estimated by controlled field studies; they are always much less than
the allowed tolerance.140  Another study suggests that "pesticide use
restrictions on fruit and vegetable production and processing would have
extremely small or even infinitesimal effects on pesticide residues in
food." 1
41
Legally allowable exposure is an unreliable proxy for actual exposure. 142
Furthermore, the overstatement of exposure applies to the most hazardous
substances. The NAS theorized that the major contributor to cancer risk from
pesticide applications on tomatoes was chlordimeform, but the California
application of the pesticides is known" and may not occur when it is known that pesticides were not
applied).
139. The chart is taken from Winter, supra note 115, at 139 (citing C.F. CHAISSON ET AL.,
PESTICDE IN OUR FOOD: FACTS, ISsUES, DEBATES AND PERCEPTIONS (1987)).
140. Notwithstanding the extremely small risk, EPA has banned the use of captan on forty-four
fruits and vegetables. Cropper et al., supra note 16, at 190 n.10.
141. C. Robert Taylor, Economic Impacts and Environmental and Food Safety Tradeoffs of
Pesticide Use Reduction on Fruits and Vegetables, at 19 (1995) (unpublished research paper, Auburn
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology).
142. See Archibald & Winter, supra note 7, at 46 (reporting that "[o]ur analysis clearly shows that
tolerances do not equal exposure and demonstrates that the use of tolerance values to calculate risk is
not appropriate"). See also 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 35 (statement of Carl Winter):
Previous risk assessment efforts have commonly focused on identifying the maximum legal
exposures which assume that all food items are treated with all possible pesticides, that the
residues are always present at the maximum allowable levels, and that the residues in the fields are
the same as those on our plates.
This approach ignores substantial evidence demonstrating that the actual use of pesticides in
food crops is much less than 100 percent, that the average residues are present at small fractions of
the allowable levels, and that things you and I may do in our own kitchens such as washing,
peeling, and cooking foods may serve to decrease residues dramatically.
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laboratory detected no residues of this pesticide on any tomato samples. 143
Yet even these low numbers from the California laboratory may overstate
exposure: residues when eaten can be much lower than those measured at
harvest due to further degradation and kitchen preparation methods. 144 Actual
residues may exceed the allowable tolerance, but this is relatively
uncommon. 145 For example, merely washing produce can reduce residues by
97%. 146 The dissipation of residues is well demonstrated empirically: a study
on tomatoes found field residues of a pesticide at 17.4% of the tolerance, but
the concentration declined to less than 0.2% of the tolerance by the time the
produce reached the grocery store. 147 Carl Winter of the University of
California at Davis estimates that "more realistic measures of exposure are
commonly thousands to hundreds of thousands of times lower than those
obtained by estimating the maximum legal exposures."'148 Another study of
eight carcinogenic pesticides "found that actual human exposures in food had
been overestimated by factors of 99,000 to 463,000." 14  When the NAS
estimates were recalculated for specific pesticides based upon actual dietary
exposures, the true risks "were from 4600 to nearly 100,000 times lower."
150
143. See id. at 44.
144. See id. at 35 (statement of Carl Winter). Residues are measured on unwashed fresh produce,
with the skin or peel left intact. See Philip H. Abelson, Pesticides and Food, 259 SCIENCE 1235
(1993); see also Charles M. Benbrook, What We Know, Don't Know, and Need to Know about
Pesticide Residues in Food, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 48, at 140, 144.
Benbrook observes: "[S]ubsequent handling, washing, processing, and cooking of the crop typically
reduces the level of residues in the food as ultimately consumed by the public". Id. Benbrook goes on
to observe that these factors may dissipate all of the residues on the food actually consumed. See id.
145. See REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD, supra note 42, at 61 (GAO and FDA have found
residues exceeding tolerances in 3-4% of samples). Most of this 3-4% violation rate is not attributable
to high exposures on permitted crops but is due to the identification of some residue, often minuscule,
on crops for which no tolerance has been established. See Archibald & Winter, supra note 7, at 36; see
also Charles L. Trichilo & Richard D. Schmitt, The Role of the Environmental Protection Agency in
Assuring a Safe Food Supply, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 48, at 286, 288
(most violations were not quantitative exceedances of tolerances but presence of some residues on
commodities for which tolerances were not established). It is also salient that "consumer exposure to
violative residues would usually be of short duration, while the risks of cancer and most other toxic
effects typically require continuous exposure to a chemical for periods of weeks to years." Id. at 46.
Other research has found a violation rate of only one percent. See Abelson, supra note 144; see
also 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 171 (statement of Professor C. Robert Taylor) (reviewing
studies finding violation rate of 1.1% to 1.84%). Even when violations occur, they generally present no
public health risk. See Winter, supra note 115, at 145-47 (noting that tolerances are often set below
levels of safety or negligible risk).
146. See Henry B. Chin, The Effect of Processing on Residues in Foods, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES
AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 48, at 177 (reporting study of pesticide residues on tomatoes).
147. Gary L. Eilrich, Tracking the Fate of Residues from the Farm Gate to the Table, in
PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 48, at 209.
148. 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 35.
149. HARVARD CENTER FOR RISK ANALYSIS, RISK IN PERSPECTIVE, Mar. 1995, at 1.
150. Archibald & Winter, supra note 7, at 39.
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Adopting the lower end of this overstated risk level as typical would still
reduce the overall risk from pesticide residues from 6 in 1000 to about 2 in
1,000,000. Taking the upper end would reduce the risk to 1 in 10,000,000.
An FDA analysis of actual consumption, the Total Diet Study, has found that
"dietary intakes of pesticides are usually less than 1% of the Acceptable
Daily Intakes (ADIs) established by the United Nations' Food and
Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization."'151 The Green
Mountain Institute for Environmental Democracy, which studies
comparative risks, took note of the low residue levels and reported that
pesticides on food present "very little if any risks to the general
population."'
152
These extremely low risk figures assume that all of the consumed
pesticides are absorbed and have a consequent effect on health. Yet recent
research suggests that even some consumed pesticides might have no effect.
The pesticides might be bound in such a way that they are not biologically
available and are harmlessly excreted.
153
Absent bioavailability, even the above risk figures might be overstated in
actual fact. Thus, scientists distinguish between the absorbed dose ingested
and the internal, or effective dose, which is "the amount of a risk agent
reaching a tissue or an organ where it inflicts damage."'154 For at least one
pesticide, atrazine, residue-based exposure assessments overestimate actual
risk because its "metabolites have been shown to pass through animals
rapidly and essentially unchanged.'
'155
A final reason why the NAS overstated the public health risk of pesticides
lies in its risk assessment methodology. The Academy used EPA procedures
which embrace a "conservative policy in estimating risk" that "probably
overstate[s] true oncogenic risk."'156 In effect, "all components of the risk
analysis are taken at their most conservative value." 57 Dated assumptions
about dietary patterns further exaggerate the estimated risk.'58 While this
151. Pasquale Lombardo & Norma J. Yess, The Food and Drug Administration Program on
Pesticide Residues in Food, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 48, at 162, 166.
152. Green Mountain Institute for Environmental Democracy, Technical Reviews, SYNERGY,
Nov.Dec. 1996, at 13.
153. See Sam Kacew et al., Bloavailability ofBound Pesticide Residues and Potential Toxicologic
Consequences-An Update, 211 PROC. SOC'Y EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY & MED. 62 (1996).
154. JOHN . COHRSSEN & VINCENT T. COVELLO, RISK ANALYSIS: A GUIDE To PRINCIPLES AND
METHODS FOR ANALYZING HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 75 (1989).
155. Larry G. Ballantine & Bruce J. Simoneaux, Pesticide Metabolites in Food, in PESTICIDE
RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 48, at 96, 104.
156. REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD, supra note 42, at 50.
157. Archibald & Winter, supra note 7, at 34-35.
158. See id. at36-38.
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approach is not uncommon in the context of government regulation of
environmental carcinogens, the practice overstates the actual public health
threat, often considerably.15 9 The risk estimates obtained from conservative
assumptions are the "highest probability of increased incidence of cancer...
Actual incidence of cancer should be lower than the calculated estimate, and
may even be zero."'
16
B. Persisting Paradoxes of Pesticide Policy
The FQPA was aimed at a central policy paradox identified by the NAS.
The law successfully eliminated a set of inconsistent standards that produced
perverse regulations contrary to the overall public health interest. However,
the new law falls short of resolving some of the most serious paradoxes of
pesticide regulation, which will continue to yield counterproductive effects.
This section examines major paradoxes associated with the new FQPA
regime. The paradoxes arise either from the inability to acknowledge the full
benefits of pesticide usage or from continued inconsistency in regulatory
standards.
1. The Farmworker Paradox
The "reasonable certainty of no harm" standard applies to food pesticide
residues, but does not consider risks to farmworkers. These risks remain
regulated under a looser "unreasonable risk" standard in FIFRA. The
differential decision standards parallel the source of the Delaney Paradox and
create similar perversities. Under the FQPA and FIFRA, regulation of
pesticides will transfer risk from consumers to farmworkers and will
probably increase overall pesticide danger in the process.
The risk transference to workers is common throughout environmental
law. The choice to regulate a particular environmental problem may not
eliminate a risk but instead transfer that risk to another group of people.
There is an innate tendency of regulation to shift risks from more influential
groups to those with less political sway. 161 Quite often, reducing public risk
159. For a review of conservative assumptions in risk assessment, see infra notes 278-80 and
accompanying text.
160. J. Robert Tomerlin & Reto Engler, Estimation of Dietary Exposure to Pesticides Using the
Dietary Risk Evaluation System, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 48, at 192,
197.
161. See Frank B. Cross, The Subtle Vices of Environmental Values, DUKE L. & POL'Y F.
(forthcoming).
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often means creating occupational risk. 162 Thus, regulating pesticide residues
on food can increase pesticide risks to farmworkers, a particularly
disempowered group.,63 The differential standards in the law make such a
transfer legally acceptable, even if greater overall risk results. The history of
pesticide regulation, notably the developments surrounding regulation of
DDT and ethylene dibromicide demonstrates the reality of this concern.1 64
The ban on DDT transferred material risks to innocent farmworkers. DDT
was of particular concern to environmentalists, inspired by Rachel Carson, in
part because it was environmentally long-lived. 165 DDT was banned, and its
applications were replaced by a series of pesticides from a group known as
organophosphates.' 6 Unfortunately, the organophosphates were much more
acutely toxic, so the use of these substances "caused incidents of serious
poisoning among unsuspecting workers and farmers who had been
accustomed to handling the relatively nontoxic DDT."'167 The failure to
consider the risk of replacement to farmworkers is estimated to have "cost
several hundred lives.' 168 The President of the NAS announced that the
"predicted death or blinding by parathion of dozens of Americans last
summer must rest on the consciences of every car owner whose bumper
sticker urged a total ban on DDT.' 169 The undue public and regulatory
cathexis on a tiny risk of pesticide residues170 resulted in a transfer of greater
162. See Chris Whipple, Nonpessimistic Risk Assessment and de Minimis Risk as Risk
Management Tools, in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 67, at 1105,
1109.
163. See George M. Gray & John D. Graham, Regulating Pesticies, in RISK VERSUS RISK:
TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 173, 189 (John D. Graham & Jonathan
Baert Weiner eds., 1995) (observing that "the beneficiaries of reduced residue and persistence-
consumers and wildlife-may be enjoying the benefits of a risk transfer to farm workers" who "may
be particularly vulnerable when they are migrant, low-income, minority workers who lack a political
voice or the English skills to read labels").
164. See Donald T. Homstein, Paradigms, Process, and Politics: Risk and Regulatory Design, in
WORST THINGS FIRST? THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES 147,
160 n.7 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994)(observing that until recently "EPA's risk
assessments of pesticides focused predominantly on carcinogenicity among consumers due to residues
and all but ignored the workplace exposure to pesticides among the nation's two million hired
farmworkers).
165. See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 851, 870 (1996).
166. See id
167. Gray & Graham, supra note 163, at 174 (citing M.A. OTTOBONI, THE DOSE MAKES THE
POISON: A PLAIN-LANGUAGE GUIDETO TOXICOLOGY (2d ed. 1991)).
168. AARONWILDAVSKY, BuT ISITTRUE? 80(1995).
169. RICHARD L. STROUP & JOHN C. GOODMAN, NAT'L CTR. FOR POL'Y ANALYSIS, MAKING THE
WORLD LESS SAFE: THE UNHEALTHY TREND IN HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION 4 (1989) (quoting Dr. Philip handler).
170. While DDT was prohibited in part out of concerns of carcinogenicity, the best research
suggests that this concern was unwarranted. See research cited in Cross, supra note 165, at 890 n.203.
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risks to a less politically-prominent group, migrant famworkers.
Ethylene dibromide ("EDB") cancellation likewise transferred and
increased risks from pesticides. EDB was a fumigant employed to control
extremely hazardous molds, such as aflatoxin. 17' The need for treatment was
such that producers employed a substitute fumigant, but this alternative
presented greater risks to workers.
172
Traditionally, government has blithely ignored the consequences of risk
transference to farmworkers. In practice, "risks to applicators and consumers
are predicated on the assumption that no other active ingredient will be
substituted for one banned in a particular use.'' 173 Of course, assuming does
not make it so. In reality, "such substitutions are the rule rather than the
exception[.]"' 174
Nothing in the FQPA eliminates the risk from substitutes, and the
projected added regulation could readily exacerbate the risk. Even when the
risks from substitutes to farmworkers are acknowledged in regulation, risks
will shift and increase. Given the legal language and political realities, "the
EPA tolerates higher risks for exposures to pesticides incurred by workers
who manufacture, distribute, or apply pesticides than they do for the general
population."'
175
Of course, an across-the-board reduction in all pesticide usage would
have some health benefit for farmworkers as well. But the effect of FQPA
will not be a complete reduction, but will involve a shift in applications and
categories of pesticides. As experience with DDT and EDB show, in the past
a shift in pesticide categories has been toward greater risks for applicators of
pesticides, even while risks to consumers have been reduced. Therefore,
overall reduction in the total quantity of pesticides used could increase the
cumulative risk from pesticides.
For example, the overall risk would increase if the law caused a shift to
so-called natural pesticides, which are used even by organic farmers. Some
natural pesticides are notoriously unsafe. George Gray of the Harvard Center
for Risk Analysis reports that sulfur, a widely used pesticide on organic
farms, caused more occupational illnesses in California during the period
171. See Gray & Graham, supra note 163, at 186. The authors proceed to observe that consumers
may be enjoying "the benefits of a risk transfer to farm workers." Id. at 189.
172. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 17 (1993) (alternative to EDB was "more dangerous fumigants"); William R. Havender,
EDB and the Marigold Option, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 13, 16 (describing risks to
farmworkers from substitute product).
173. Cropper etal., supra note 16, at 194.
174. Id.
175. JOSEPH V. RODRICKS, CALCULATED RISKS 213 (1992).
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1984-90 than any man-made pesticide. !76 Nicotine is a natural substance,
once used as a pesticide, but abandoned as unsafe.177 Arsenic is likewise
"natural," but relatively hazardous.
2. The Cumulative Effects Paradox
The FQPA's cumulation of effects from pesticides with common toxicity
mechanisms actually tends to increase risks. The increase again results from
the existence of different legal standards for substances that operate through a
common mechanism and those that do not. By holding the former category
of pesticides to a functionally higher standard, risk will be transferred to the
latter group, and will probably increase overall.
Consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that three pesticides (A1,
A2, and A3) share a common mechanism of action requiring cumulation of
effects under the FQPA. Prevailing risk assessment places the carcinogenic
hazard from each at 0.4 in one million. Cumulating the risks results in a total
hazard of 1.2 in one million, exceeding the statutory negligible one-in-one
million risk standard. This means that one application cannot be approved.
Suppose that an unrelated pesticide B can substitute for any of the uses of the
A group and cause an assessed risk of 0.8 in one million for the typical
application. Under the FQPA, the agency could not register all three A uses
but could register two A uses and one B use, even though this will result in an
increase of overall risk from 1.2 to 1.6 in one million. The latter combination
is statutorily preferred even though it is more harmful. EPA would therefore
compel an increased risk.
While the example is theoretical, it is also highly plausible. Pesticides
come in broad groups of similar substances, such as organophosphates. The
common mechanism standard must inevitably drive some uses of these
groups off the market and replace those uses with pesticides. Conceivably,
the substitute could be safer than the group, but there is no reason to expect
this result. If the substitute is sui generis and shares no common mechanism
with other substances, EPA could approve a tolerance of up to about one in
one million, as allowed under the Act
In practice, the common mechanism provision will not decrease pesticide
use or decrease risk and it is even likely to increase overall risk from
applications. The provision will have the effect of driving manufacturer
research and development into unrelated product lines, which will not be
176. See 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 44-45.
177. W.R. Furtick, Uncontrolled Pests or Adequate Food?, in PESTICIDES AND HUMAN WELFARE
3, 12 (D.L. Gunn & J.G.R. Stevens eds., 1976).
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combined under the common mechanism provision. Once the "risk cup" is
full for a certain category of pesticides, manufacturers will tend to shift to
other categories, regardless of relative efficacy or health consequences.
Practically, the government will not dictate which pesticides are used;
industry has some control over this choice. Suppose that the "risk cup" is full
so that EPA will not register new uses of a given pesticide or category of
pesticides. Industry can begin a new use of the pesticide or a similar pesticide
by eliminating one of the pre-existing uses. The "manufacturer of the
pesticide may voluntarily cancel other existing uses of the pesticide to clear
room for the proposed tolerance under the.., ceiling., 178 Hence, private
industry has some control over which uses of pesticides will be allowed.
The possibility of voluntary cancellations adds economic efficiency to the
process and prevents valuable applications from being driven off the market
by less valuable usages. Voluntary cancellations do not, however, address
problems created by the cumulative effects paradox. Voluntary cancellations
are driven by the profit maximization of the pesticide manufacturer, not the
social welfare of users, consumers or society as a whole. Suppose that the
failure to register pesticide A3 results in use of pesticide B and thereby
increases overall risk from the substances. If A3 and B are produced by the
same company, there may be no incentive for voluntary cancellation, as the
company simply profits from greater sales of B. Even if the pesticides have
different manufacturers, there will be no voluntary cancellation unless A3
happens to be a more profitable application than the usages already
registered. One cannot rely on the good will of manufacturers to choose the
mix of pesticides that provides the highest health protection or benefit to
agricultural producers.
1
3. The Benefits Paradox
Pesticides, which cost money, are only used by farmers for some
sufficient reason. Typically the chemicals are applied to grow more produce
or harvest a given amount less expensively. Debates over pesticide regulation
often feature drawn-out debates over whether the health risks of pesticides
should be balanced against the economic benefits of usage. The economic
benefits of pesticide applications can be considerable. Direct benefits to
178. Winter, supra note 115, at 141.
179. This article contends that pesticide use has considerable positive public health externalities
and presents relatively low risk. This fortuity is the consequence of the market's invisible hand and
certain scientific facts, however, not the social conscience of pesticide manufacturers. I certainly do
not propose that the good will of these manufacturers will itself guarantee public safety.
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farmers are estimated to be $3 to $5 for each $1 invested in the use of
pesticides.1 80 However, pesticide critics commonly contend that no amount
of money can justify risks to life.' 81 This environmentalist position against
balancing lives and money does not confront the true paradox because
pesticide use often has health benefits. A reduction in pesticides to reduce
health risks may cause net health harm to the public through the loss of these
benefits. This section explores the very real health harms that will result from
reduced pesticide usage.
The practical benefits of pesticides should be apparent; agricultural
producers would not spend money on the substances if they were not
beneficial. Yet some maintain that pesticides are unnecessary, as if producers
were voluntarily throwing their money away. Some also maintain that
pesticides will become unproductive as pests develop resistance. 82 Not only
are such assertions contradicted by yield data, 183 but the position is also
illogical: producers will not spend on useless substances. 184
The nature of pest resistance is often overstated. Although "some pest
species have developed a vexing resistance to man's chemicals, most have
not; the resistant portion may be far less than one percent."' 85 Moreover,
resistance typically does not render a chemical useless in all applications;
resistance may be localized and controlled by modified pesticide application
techniques. 186 Additionally, pests that develop resistance typically contain
other deficiencies in fitness or reproductive behavior that render them
amenable to other control methods, such as a "less potent but more specific
pesticide than the one to which resistance has developed."' 87 Agricultural
180. See David Pimentel et al., Environmental and Economic Effects of Reducing Pesticide Use,
41 BIOSCIENCE, 402, 402 (1991) (citations omitted)).
181. This argument was made by a number of environmental groups testifying on an earlier
version of the FQPA. See generally 1995 Hearings, supra note 31.
182. See also id. at 81-82 (statement of Erik Olson of Natural Resources Defense Council)
(suggesting that pesticide benefits were limited by development of resistant pests).
183. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
184. Nor will manufacturers produce pesticides that lack a market due to resistance. See George P.
Georghiou, The Magnitude of the Resistance Problem, in COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIES FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF PESTICIDE RESISTANT PEST POPULATIONS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
PESTICIDE RESISTANCE: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR MANAGEMENT 14, 35 (1986) [hereinafter
PESTICIDE RESISTANCE] (slowing in development and introduction of new pesticides to anticipated
resistance problems).
185. GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH 79 (1995). This small number does not
demean the prospect of resistance, which is a problem for certain pests of certain crops throughout the
world. See Georghiou, supra note 184, at 14-44 (discussing development of pesticide resistance). The
relative infrequency of serious pesticide resistance does demonstrate that the chemicals have
continuing value to agriculture.
186. LEONARD T. FLYNN, PESTICIDES: HELPFUL OR HARMFUL? 28-29 (1989).
187. Id. at 29.
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researchers have devoted considerable energy toward effectively managing
the development of resistance and perpetuating the effectiveness of
pesticides. 188 Furthermore, the presence of resistance also increases the need
for registration of new pesticide products.
189
The case for the practical benefits of pesticides does not rest merely upon
theoretical models. Empirical experience with regulation demonstrates the
effect. When EPA canceled one pesticide under the Delaney Clause, mint
yields promptly declined by 13%. 190 Another cancellation resulted in a loss
of 50 million pounds from North Carolina's apple crop. 191 In many past
cases, losses from pesticide cancellation were small because substitute
pesticides were available.192 However, the FQPA is not expected merely to
shift pesticide uses, but to reduce overall use considerably.
Even when alternative pesticides were available, producers suffered
economic losses or added costs.193 As a general rule "crop yields from
organic farms are typically half or less those of high-yield mainstream
farmers."' 194 The most comprehensive study available concluded that a 50%
reduction in pesticide use would increase the per unit production costs of
fruits and vegetables from 20 to 40%. 195 Research suggests that each 1%
reduction in crop yield "results in a corresponding 4.5% increase in the farm
188. See, e.g., Executive Summary, in PESTICIDE RESISTANCE, supra note 184, at 1, 1-2
(describing effectiveness of methods of pesticide resistance management); see also P.K. Leonard,
IRAC Fruit Crops Working Group Spider Mite Resistance Management Strategy, in RESISTANCE '91:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN COMBATING PESTICIDE RESISTANCE 41 (Ian Denholm et al.
eds., 1992) [hereinafter RESISTANCE '91]; Louise R Cooke, Resistance to Phenylamide Fungicides:
Strategies and Their Evaluation, in RESISTANCE '91, supra, at 100; Bernard C. Smale, The
International Organization for Resistant Pest Management (1RPM: A Fresh Collaborative Approach,
in RESISTANCE '91, supra, at 112.
189. See Bruce D. Hammock & David M. Soderlund, Chemical Strategies for Resistance
Management, in PESTICIDE RESISTANCE, supra note 184, at 111, 113:
The effective management of pesticide resistance, however, involves not only the judicious use of
existing compounds but also the discovery and development of new chemical control agents. No
management strategy can prolong the useful life of pesticides indefinitely. New chemical tools
will be needed, particularly those that exploit new biochemical targets. Thus, rather than removing
us from a "pesticide treadmill," IPM and resistance management will only slow the treadmill....
190. See 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 38-39 (statement of Leonard Gianessi of National
Center for Food and Agricultural Policy).
191. See id.
192. See Cropper et al., supra note 16, at 182 (reporting that in "35 percent of all cases, losses
[from pesticide cancellation] are negligible because of the availability of substitute pesticides").
193. See 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 38 (suggesting that cancellations from the application
of the Delaney clause would increase costs by $40 million for cotton growers, $22 million for grape
growers, and $5 million for citrus growers).
194. Dennis Avery, Saving the Planet with Pesticides, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 49,70
(Ron Bailey ed., 1995) (citing P.J. Michaels & D.E. Stooksbury, Global Warming: A Reducing
Threat? 73 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC'Y 1563 (1992)).
195. See 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 173 (statement of Professor C. Robert Taylor).
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price of goods."'196 Not all of this increase will be passed on to consumers,
but a significant portion eventually will have to be paid by purchasers of
fruits and vegetables. 197  "[E]conomic studies indicate that restricting
pesticides to reduce carcinogenic residues would likely raise the prices of
foods significantly."' 98
The simplest economic graph informs us that an increase in a product's
price will result in some reduction in its consumption. The relationship
between these variables is expressed as price elasticity. For domestic use, a
10% increase in the price of fruits and vegetables would cause a reduction of
consumption between 2.2 and 6.1%, depending on the particular product
category. 199 A 50% reduction in pesticide use would promptly reduce
domestic consumption of fruits and vegetables by 4 to 7%.200 The
consumption drop-off would be even greater if added restrictions were
placed on imports produced with pesticides.20' Much of this reduced
consumption would be felt by the poor.20 2
Reduced consumption of fruits and vegetables is not a good thing for the
overall public health. Consumption of such produce "is associated with a
lowered risk of degenerative diseases such as cancer, cardiovascular disease,
cataracts, and brain and immune dysfunction. ' 20 3 As it happens, pesticides
are essential for those fruits and vegetables that are most beneficial to
health.2° In general, "increasing consumption of fruits and vegetables can
196. Pimentel et al.,supra note 180, at 406.
197. See 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 174-75 (statement of Professor C. Robert Taylor)
(observing that in the intermediate term about half of the increase will be passed on, while in the long
run, nearly all will be passed forward to consumers); Cropper et al., supra note 16, at 181 (suggesting
that yield losses or cost increases will lead to consumer price increases).
198. Gray & Graham, supra note 163, at 190.
199. See 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 174 (statement of Professor C. Robert Taylor).
200. See id. at 175.
201. See id.
202. See HARVARD CENTER FOR RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 149, at 2 (observing that for "poor
families and households on fixed incomes, higher food prices increase the risk of malnutrition and its
associated illnesses").
203. Bruce N. Ames & Lois Swirsky Gold, The Causes and Prevention of Cancer, in THE TRUE
STATE OFTHE PLANET, supra note 194, at 144, 150.
204. See REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD, supra note 42, at 49 (observing that "[v]irtually all
perishable fresh fruits and vegetables ... depend heavily on pesticides. Some are treated a dozen or
more times each year with six or more different active ingredients"); CARCINOGENS AND
ANTICARCINOGENS IN THE HUMAN DIET, supra note 129, at 246 (pesticides most common in fresh
fruits and vegetables).
A public interest organization called the Environmental Working Group has recently counseled
against eating such products as strawberries, bell peppers, spinach, cherries, peaches, cantaloupe,
celery, and other vegetables, due to pesticide residues. See ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, A
SHOPPER'S GUIDE TO PESTICIDES IN PRODUCE 3. Yet consumers who follow the publication's advice
will probably harm their health, losing substantial health benefits in exchange for minuscule risks
posed by the pesticides. See Cross, supra note 165, at 887-89.
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help reduce the risk of some cancers, with benefits far outweighing possible
cancer risks from the pesticides. 205
The health of consumers will suffer if fiuits and vegetables become
unavailable. While produce will probably still be available, reductions in
pesticides may increase the costs of fiuits and vegetables markedly. Philip
Abelson, the president of the American Academy for the Advancement of
Science, warns:
The public has become increasingly aware that a diet that includes
four or five fruits or vegetables per day substantially reduces the
incidence of many types of cancers. At present, supplies of these foods
are abundant and relatively inexpensive. But continuation of trends in
the cancellation (banning) of fungicides could lead to food
scarcities.20 6
Abelson states that if synthetic fungicides were wholly unavailable, experts
predict apple production would drop 40%, and losses for grapes, peaches,
and strawberries would be 33%, 49%, and 38%, respectively.
20 7
Given the extremely low risk from pesticide residues, a reduction in the
amount of health-giving products will surely cause greater health harms.
Scientists from the National Cancer Institute warn that if pesticides were
outlawed, "prices would rise and demand could fall for foods that have been
shown to prevent cancer, such as broccoli and carrots. 208 Even if availabily
and cost were unaffected, pesticide reductions could still have further health
disadvantages. For example, "fruits that are inadequately protected against
pests have been shown to have lower nutritional value, including less
Vitamin C in apples, than fruits protected with pesticides."209
The adverse effects of pesticide regulation on fruit and vegetable
availability will be felt especially by poor individuals. 210 Organic foods
grown without pesticides are distinctly more expensive. Such foods will be
205. 135 CONG. REc. 12, 821 (1989) (remarks of Rep. Hamilton).
206. Philip H. Abelson, Adequate Supplies of Fruits and Vegetables, 266 SCIENCE 1303 (1994).
207. See id.
208. See Sheehy, supra note 25, at 275 n.191 (quoting Keith Schneider, Cancer Controversy: An
Appeals Court Ruling Would Ban 35 Pesticides, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1992, at D2). See also Gray &
Graham, supra note 163, at 179 (observing that "[i]f substitute pesticides are less effective or more
expensive than the banned products, crop yields may be constrained and the prices of critical foods,
especially fruits and vegetables, may rise significantly").
209. 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 44 (statement of George Gray, Deputy Director of the
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis).
210. See Gray & Graham, supra note 163, at 190 (observing that if "the prices of fruits and
vegetables rose, the effect would be very regressive, with the largest impact on the poorest segment of
the population").
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consumed less, and consumers will lose the considerable health benefits
offered generally by fruits and vegetables. Ames claims that "[m]aking these
foods more expensive by reducing synthetic pesticide use is likely to increase
cancer."2 ' The consequences of pesticide regulation are not merely
counterproductive in terms of public health; they are distributionally
perverse. The health burdens of pesticide reductions will be bome centrally
by the disadvantaged. "Higher food prices and less nutritional food selection
at the market would disproportionately affect low-income consumers, who
may spend as much as sixty percent of their income on food.
' 212
The health risks of the FQPA should not be exaggerated. Some evidence
suggests that pesticide use could be reduced significantly without serious
adverse consequences to agriculture. Indeed, one survey contends that total
U.S. pesticide usage might be reduced as much as 35 to 50%, at a cost of
about $1 billion.213 Of course, $1 billion is not a trivial increase in cost, and
not everyone agrees with the conclusions of this study.214 Moreover, the
feasible reduction in use proposed by these authors comes not from
regulatory action, but rather from improved application and monitoring
equipment.
2 15
The problem with the FQPA and other government efforts to reduce
pesticide usage is the crudeness of the regulatory tool. The mandatory
reductions in pesticide use will not parallel the safe and effective reductions
possible. Even if overall use could be reduced by one-half, this is not
necessarily the same half to be reduced through regulation. The authors who
proposed the feasibility of the dramatic usage restriction favored improved
efficiency in pesticide applications, not bans on such applications.
No uniform national regulations can rationally reduce the risks from
pesticides without compromising the health benefits of pesticides. The NAS
discussed some of the factors associated with the wise usage of pesticides:
In any growing season, economic factors can alter which pesticides
are used on a given crop in a given area. The price of the crop might
be up or down, affecting how much growers are willing to spend for a
certain amount of pest control. Weather and soil conditions can
211. See Ames & Gold, supra note 203, at 159. See also Julie Corliss, The Delaney Clause: Too
Much ofa Good Thing?, 85 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 600, 601 (1993) (citing Professor Manfred Kroger
to the effect that "the benefits of pesticides, which help ensure widely available and affordable fruits
and vegetables, justify their use").
212. Curme, supra note 30, at 643.
213. See Pimental et al., supra note 180.
214. See Pimental et al., supra note 180, at 404.
215. See Pimental et al., supra note 180, at 404
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preclude or command certain treatments. The presence or absence of a
given pest affects pesticide use. The emergence of pest resistance to
previously applied pesticides can lead to rapid shifts in pesticide use
patterns.
2 16
Pesticide applications vary wildly, depending upon "unusual weather and
pest problems. 217 Setting a given tolerance for specific crop applications
cannot account for these fluctuating needs. Consequently, a regulatory
regime for pesticide residues cannot produce the desirable reduction in use of
the product. Agricultural producers have an incentive to respond to dynamic
conditions and reduce unnecessary use of inputs such as pesticides when
possible,218 so that an information program or incentives for more efficient
application will be safer and more effective than regulation.
Many advocates of stricter pesticide regulation embrace Integrated Pest
Management ("IPM"). 219 IPM is a rather amorphous combination of
biological controls intended to control pests in the absence of synthetic
pesticides. It may include the introduction of natural predators, such as a
beetle that eats the target insect IPM may also include the introduction of
parasites, diseases, or naturally resistant characteristics in plants. The
following section will address the possibility that some of these natural pest
controls may prove more hazardous to human health than synthetic ones.
Regardless of that risk, the potential value of IPM does not delegitimate the
use of pesticides.
The effectiveness of IPM is far from perfect, a fact that should be obvious
from prevailing use of synthetic pesticides. IPM is already statutorily
encouraged,220 and if it had the utopian effectiveness promised by advocates
at reasonable cost, agricultural producers would be falling over themselves to
adopt the practice.22' While chemical manufacturers of pesticides may have
216. REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD, supra note 42, at 48-49.
217. See Gianessi, supra note 120, at 26. The author notes that in an ordinary year, about 1% of
Illinois soybeans are treated with insecticides, but the drought of 1988 required that 40% of the crop be
so treated. Id.
218. See J.L. Adams, The Farmer's Stake in Food Safety, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD
SAFETY, supra note 48, at 47. Adams suggests that for economic reasons farmers have no interest in
applying even "one unnecessary drop of agrichemical" to crops. Id. Adams further observes that
agrichemical use is actually declining. See id.
219. See, e.g., Hearings on Food Safety Issues, Before House Subcomm. on Dep't Operations,
Research and Foreign Agriculture, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 805 (1992) (statement of Mike Wallace, co-
chairman of National Coalition on Integrated Pest Management) (reporting that expanded IPM could
reduce pesticide use by half).
220. See 7 U.S.C. § 136w-3 (1994).
221. See Allen L. Jennings, Some Economic and Social Aspects of Pesticide Use, in PESTICIDE
RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 48, at 32, 36 (observing that farmers use pesticides because
they offer some economic or social advantage over the alternatives). In trying to discover why
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an incentive to undermine IPM, that incentive does not extend to the
producers who actually decide what pest method to apply. The continued use
of synthetic pesticides is testimony to their efficiency and effectiveness
compared to IPM.22
IPM has had some successes and is currently employed,223 but the
practice has too many failures to eliminate the need for synthetic
pesticides.224 Very few pests are effectively managed by using IPM alone
without pesticides. 5 EPA's ban on the controversial pesticide Alar
undermined an IPM program for apples and incidentally caused a greater
overall use of pesticides.226 Moreover, IPM involves its own set of
environmental risks, as the introduction of non-native species can disrupt
ecosystems in unforeseen ways.227
Indeed, while IPM will often reduce total pesticide usage, many IPM
bioherbicides have not caught on, a commentator noted that no one had yet produced "a commercial
product effective against a major weed in one of the world's main crops." M.P. Greaves & M.D.
MacQueen, Bioherbicides: Their Role in Tomorrow's Agriculture, in RESISTANCE '91, supra note 188,
at 295,299. Moreover, bioherbicides may be more difficult to apply effectively. See id. at 301.
222. See FLYNN, supra note 186, at 41 (observing "[m]odem agriculture does not neglect
nonchemical methods when they are appropriate because today's farmers cannot afford to waste
resources on unnecessary chemicals when less costly nonchemical methods will suffice"); Adams,
supra note 218, at 48 (suggesting that "producers are always looking for ways to cut back if there's a
way to get the same results with lower application rates").
223. See FLYNN, supra note 186, at 38-39 (describing how introduction of natural insects and
diseases are used to control citrus fruit diseases, Japanese beetle grubs, and other threats to crops).
224. See Louis A. Falcon, Development and Use of Microbial Insecticides, in BIOLOGICAL
CONTROL IN AGRICULTURAL IPM SYSTEMS 229, 236 (Marjorie A. Hoy & Donald C. Herzog eds.,
1985) (declaring that relative ineffectiveness of microbial insecticides indicates that they may have "no
future... as commercial products'); J.D. Podgwaite, Strategies for Field Use of Baculoviruses, in
VIRAL INSECTICIDES FOR BIOLOGICAL CONTROL 775, 776 (Karl'Maramorosch & K.E. Sherman eds.,
1985) (reporting that inconsistent field results with biological control products prevent use as
substitute for pesticides); J.P. Hudson, Fruit Crops: A Rather Special Case, in PESTICIDES AND
HUMAN WELFARE, supra note 177, at 81, 89 (observing that IPM "has had rather little success up to
now with the major pests of temperate fruits"); Jilrgen Kranz, Vegetables, in PESTICIDES AND HUMAN
WELFARE, supra note 177, at 93, 101 (reporting that there "is little scope for immediate biological
control in short-lived vegetables").
225. See KEITH C. BARRONS, ARE PESTICIDES REALLY NECESSARY? 47 (1981); D.L. Gunn,
Alternatives to Chemical Pesticides, in PESTICIDES AND HUMAN WELFARE, supra note 177, at 241,
249-50 (reporting how efforts to sterilize pest species have generally failed) and 251-52 (indicating use
of hormones and pheromones to control pests has little promise).
226. This story is explained in Gianessi, supra note 120, at 29.
227. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 225, at 244 (pointing out that the danger of "introducing an exotic
plant parasite is that it will not confine itself to the target species of plant but will attack crop species
and become a pest itself"); id. at 245 (observing that biological microbes used to attack insect pests
may also threaten human health). Mongooses were introduced to the island of Jamaica in order to
control rat populations, but the rats managed to escape the mongooses, which then became a pest
attacking poultry in the island. See id at 247. Australia is releasing genetically engineered viruses in
an attempt to control imported red foxes and rabbits. See Virginia Morell, Australian Pest Control by
Virus Causes Concern, 261 SCIENCE 683, 683 (1993).
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programs require the use of pesticides.2 IPM usage is often only possible if
farmers have "a wide variety of pesticides to choose from."2 29 "[Very few]
pests can be effectively managed by integrated genetic, biological and
cultivation methods alone."230 IPM may be far more effective thanks to
"synergistic action" when combined with conventional pesticides.23' In some
circumstances, "IPM programs have resulted in increased pesticide use."
232
Those regulations "which eliminate appropriate uses of pesticides may be
counterproductive to the implementation of IPM."'233 Moreover, the most
effective biological IPM controls are likely to depend upon advances in
biotechnology,234 which itself is challenged by many environmentalists.
235
To the extent that IPM is beneficial, as it may often be, pesticide
regulation may undermine the practices. Moreover, pesticide regulation is not
necessary to encourage effective IPM. When its implementation reduces
pesticide usage, it will also mean "increase[d] profits for the producer[.] 236
Encouraging IPM may require additional research and education, but
additional pesticide regulation may only frustrate IPM's development.2 7 The
effectiveness of IPM systems will vary by weather, soil, geography, crop and
other factors. A heavy-handed uniform federal regulatory system cannot
accommodate such variations as well as the judgments of local producers.
228. See Curme, supra note 30, at 625.
229. See Patrick W. Weddle, Pesticide-Free Tree Fruit Crops: Can We Meet Consumer
Demands?, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 48, at 58, 62 (observing that IPM
"can be hampered by excessive constraints to pesticide use").
230. See FLYNN, supra note 186, at 41; see also Gianessi, supra note 120, at 27 (reporting that
"pesticides have an important role in most successful IPM programs"). When pesticide use is
abandoned, "the IPM programs are completely disrupted[.]" Id.
231. See Greaves & MacQueen, supra note 221, at 302.
232. Gianessi, supra note 120, at 27-28 (referencing IPM program for peanuts in Alabama as
example).
233. Weddle, supra note 229, at 63.
234. See Greaves & MacQueen, supra note 221, at 302-03 (absent biotechnological manipulation,
the discernment of effective controls is "very hit-and-miss"). See also Maijorie A. Hoy, Genetic
Engineering of Predators and Parasitoids for Pesticide Resistance, in RESISTANCE '91, supra note
188, at 307.
235. See, e.g., David J. Earp, The Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants: Is Peter Rabbit
Safe in Mr. McGregor's Transgenic Vegetable Patch?, 24 ENVTL. L. 1633 (1994) (reviewing the
controversy and calling for additional federal regulatory authority over agricultural biotechnology,
including development of natural pesticides).
236. K. Jack Haugrud, Agriculture, in SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8.5 (Celia
Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993).
237. See Weddle, supra note 229, at 65 (observing that most effective approach to IPM
implementation would be providing farmers with additional information and experience on methods).
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4. The Natural Risk Paradox
Critics of chemical pesticides typically have a Panglossian view of nature.
They presume that "organic" foods, produced without manmade chemicals,
are somehow safe to eat. Yet this presumption is dubious. Natural presticides
"are apparently present in all plants and may make up 5-10% of a plant's dry
weight. 2 38 Professor Bruce Ames of California estimates that "99.99 percent
of the pesticides we eat are naturally present in plants to ward off insects and
other predators.' 239
Naturalness does not render these substances benign, as many of these
natural pesticides are apparently carcinogenic, at least as indicated by the sort
of rat or other animal bioassays employed to test synthetic chemicals for
carcinogenic potential.240 Furthermore, the quantity of natural carcinogens is
much greater, and natural substances on average appear to have a greater
carcinogenic potency than synthetic carcinogens. 24' Indeed, "few synthetic
chemicals equal the potency and human toxicity of naturally occurring
products. 2 42 Ames suggests that "[t]here are more rodent carcinogens in a
single cup of coffee than potentially carcinogenic [synthetic] pesticide
residues in the average American diet in a year."
243
Even those who acknowledge the presence of natural carcinogens may
argue that we might as well reduce exposure to synthetic carcinogens. Yet
this logic is inapplicable if regulation of synthetics merely increases exposure
to natural pesticides, particularly when some forms of IPM may be far more
hazardous than synthetic chemical pesticides.244 When researchers bred a
pest-free potato, it was "so full of natural pesticides that it was acutely
poisonous to humans.2 45 Other species seek to protect their seeds from pests
by releasing hydrogen cyanide when damaged, but this mechanism is too
toxic to rely upon.
246
238. Fred R. Shank et al., Evolving Food Safety, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY,
supra note 48, at 297, 299.
239. Ames & Gold, supra note 203, at 143; see also Bruce N. Ames et al., Ranking Possible
Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 SCIENCE 271 (1987).
240. See Ames et al., supra note 239; see also Carl K. Winter, Toxins of Plant Origin, in
CHEMICALS IN THE HUMAN FOOD CHAIN, supra note 7, at 221 (reviewing evidence of harmful effects
of a variety of natural substances).
241. See CARCINOGENS AND ANTICARCINOGENS IN THE HUMAN DIET, supra note 129, at 291.
242. MELVIN A. BENARDE, OUR PRECARIOUS HABITAT 71 (1989).
243. Ames & Gold, supra note 203, at 159.
244. See Avery, supra note 194, at 69.
245. Cross, supra note 165, at 873. Similar efforts with celery caused a substantial increase in a
naturally occurring carcinogen. See id,
246. See John A. Pickett, Potential of Novel Chemical Approaches for Overcoming Insecticide
Resistance, in RESISTANCE '91, supra note 188, at 354,357.
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In addition to natural pesticides engineered by humans, nature itself may
produce higher levels of hazardous substances. When fungicides are not
applied, "plants in self-defense create phytoalexins, some of which are toxic
to humans and induce carcinomas in rodents."247 Now-Justice Breyer,
previously a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
observed that regulators must consider behavior such as "when a farmer,
deprived of his small-cancer-risk artificial pesticide, grows a new, hardier
crop variety that contains more 'natural pesticides' which may be equally or
more carcinogenic[.], 248 On balance, "there would be adverse indirect food
safety consequences of severely restricting or banning pesticide use in terms
of increased contamination by fungal products and by phytoalexins created in
self-defense by plants."249 The levels of natural carcinogens in food "may
increase dramatically in plants damaged by insects or fungi[,]" 250 and the
resultant natural carcinogens may prove much more hazardous than the
synthetic carcinogens regulated. Dr. Bruce Ames has flatly declared that
"pesticides lower the cancer rate."
251
Moreover, pesticides are often applied in order to combat natural
carcinogens directly, particularly mycotoxins. Mycotoxins are "highly
poisonous compounds of small molecular weight produced by molds or
fungi."252 One well-known example of a mycotoxin is the poisonous
mushroom. Mycotoxins are replete throughout the food supply, found in
dozens of foods.253 One such mycotoxin is aflatoxin, a notoriously
carcinogenic substance contaminating grains. Pesticides are often applied in
order to combat human exposure to mycotoxins.
Past regulation of pesticides has increased the overall risk from exposure
to mycotoxins. For example, the notorious pesticide Alar was used to control
fruit drop of apples. When treated apples remain on the trees, the fruit is less
susceptible to hazardous molds.254 The fungicide EDB, cancelled due to a
largely unwarranted cancer scare,255 was at the time "the safest known way to
247. Abelson, supra note 206.
248. BREYER, supra note 172, at 23.
249. Taylor, supra note 141, at 18.
250. Shank et al., supra note 238, at 299-300.
251. Jane E. Brody, Strong Views on Origins of Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1994, at Cl (quoting
Ames).
252. Dennis P.H. Hsieh & Stefan H.O. Gruenwedel, Microbial Toxins, in CHEMICALS IN THE
HUMAN FOOD CHAIN, supra note 7, at 239, 243.
253. See id. at 244 thl. 5-4 (noting in chart the presence of mycotoxins in products from wheat,
corn, nuts, apples, beans, and other foods).
254. Bruce N. Ames & Lois Swirsky Gold, Environmental Pollution and Cancer: Some
Misconceptions, in RATIONAL READINGS ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 165 (Jay H. Lehr ed. 1992).
255. See Havender, supra note 172 (discussing how EDB ban was based on overblown fears of
consumer carcinogenicity).
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combat molds, which produce some of the most potent carcinogens in all of
nature."' 56 Interestingly, organic apple juice was condemned by a California
health department because of high mycotoxin concentrations. 257 Meanwhile,
EDB, as noted above,258 was replaced by substitute pesticides more
hazardous to farmworkers. In this case, regulation may have sidestepped the
natural risk paradox, but only at the cost of causing the farmworker paradox.
EPA can set standards for natural carcinogens, but such rules are rare and
established under a looser standard than that of the FQPA. The contrast is
apparent from the EDB ban. "Afilatoxin BI is about 1,000 times more potent
than EDB, yet it is allowed in foods at levels as high as 20 ppb-nearly ten
times higher than the average level of EDB found pre-ban in grain-based
food products." 259 This result occurred notwithstanding the fact that EDB
was the safest known way to combat molds, some of which contain the
natural toxin afiatoxin.260
5. The Hormetic Paradox
Federal public health regulation is based on the premise that if exposure
to a high level is bad, lower exposures are always safer. Thus, when high
exposure levels in scientific testing demonstrate a statistically significant
increase in cancer, the government typically assumes that the relationship
between exposure and hazard is linear. Consequentially, lower exposure
levels always mean less risk, and zero exposure is the safest situation of all.
While these presumptions are well established politically, their scientific
basis is less certain. A concept known as hormesis 261 occurs when "a
substance presenting a mortality risk at high levels of exposure actually
protects against death or disease at low levels of exposure."262 Lest this seem
paradoxical or implausible, remember that vaccination often involves
256. STROUP & GOODMAN, supra note 169, at 4 (1989); see also John D. Graham & Jonathan
Baert Weiner, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 163, at 13, 13-14
(observing that the EDB ban "may have left on grains and nuts a fungus that promotes aflatoxins more
carcinogenic than the fungicide").
257. See Weddle, supra note 229, at 66.
258. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
259. AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH, DOES NATURE KNOW BEST?: NATURAL
CARCINOGENS AND ANTICARCINOGENS IN AMERICA'S FOOD" 31 (1996).
260. Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 943 (1994) (reporting
safety and effectiveness ofEDB); BREYER, supra note 172, at 17 (observing that EDB ban could lead
farmers "to fumigate their crops less well, leaving more mold residues, which bring with them an
increased cancer risk from aflatoxin").
261. Hormesis is subsumed in the study of the biological effects of low level exposure, sometimes
called BELLE.
262. Cross, supra note 165, at 896.
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exposure to a very low level of the disease to be prevented.263 Exposure to a
low level toxicant may provoke the body to increase its production of
protective substances.264 Indeed, the exposure might stimulate DNA repair
that exceeded the DNA damage caused by the low exposure.
While hormesis has been generally ignored by federal regulators, 265 a
significant number of studies now demonstrate hormetic effects for
carcinogens and other hazards.266 A large study conducted by EPA scientists
on numerous chemicals found that exposure to very low doses of chemical
carcinogens actually decreased the amount of DNA damage found in test
animals, or even improved the animals' health in other ways.267 Even a
leading FDA scientist has declared that information "is accumulating rapidly
indicat[ing] that hormesis is operating in a number of areas of toxicology."26 8
If hormesis is true for pesticides, efforts to reduce the already low exposure
levels may do more harm than good. Hormetic effects have indeed been
found for some pesticide exposures.26 9 Indeed, in "many chronic studies on
263. Recognition of hormesis goes back some time. Hippocrates observed that a substance
(hellebore) caused cholera-like symptoms at high doses but successfully treated cholera when given in
low doses. See Harold Boxenbaum et al., Hormesis, Gompertz Functions, and Risk Assessment, 19
DRUG METABOLISM REv. 195, 200 (1988).
264. See Donald E. Stevenson et al., Challenges To Low-Dose Linearity In Carcinogenesis From
Interactons Among Mechanistic Components As Exemplified By The Concept Of "Invaders" and
"Defenders," BELLE NEWSL. (U. Mass. Sch. of Pub. Health, Amherst, Ma.), Nov. 1994, at 2-3
(discussing response); RtW. Hart & L.T. Frame, Toxicological Defense Mechanisms and How They
May Affect the Nature of Dose-Response Relationships, BELLE NEWSL. (U. Mass. Sch. of Pub.
Health, Amherst, Ma.), June 1996, at I (noting that risk assessment models generally "do not take into
account the diverse toxicological defense mechanisms that enhance survival in the face of minor
environmental adversity"). The nature of this response curve is shown in Werner K. Lutz, Dose-
Response Relationships in Chemical Carcinogenesis: From DNA Adducts to Tumor Incidence, 283
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL MED. & BIOLOGY 151 (1991).
265. See Sidney Green & Michael L. Dourson, How Regulatory Agencies Fiew BELLE, BELLE
NEWSL. (U. Mass. Sch. of Pub. Health, Amherst, Ma.), May 1995, at 6 (reporting that "[a]lthough the
concept of hormesis has been discussed in the scientific community for a number of years, it was
accorded only superficial recognition until recently"). Even today, Green reports, a deficiency of
research resources caused FDA to ignore hormesis in its internal planning report. See id. at 7. EPA has
considered hormesis only for nutrients. See id. (statement of Michael L. Dourson, Chief of Systemic
Toxicants Assessment Branch ofU.S. EPA).
266. See J. Michael Davis & David L. Svendsgaard, U-Shaped Dose-Response Curves: Their
Occurrence and Implications for Risk Assessment, 30 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 71 (1990)
(summarizing twenty-nine studies demonstrating such effects).
267. See Kirk T. Kitchin & Janice L. Brown, Dose-Response Relationship for Rat Liver DNA
Damage Caused by 49 Rodent Carcinogens, 88 TOXICOLOGY 31 (1994).
268. Green & Dourson, supra note 265, at 6.
269. There has been limited testing for hormetic effects, but one study of female rats showed that
ingestion of low levels of DDT throughout their lives gave the rats a much longer reproductive life
span. See Alice Ottoboni, Effect of DDT on the Reproductive Life-Span in the Female Rat, 22
TOXICOLOGY & APPLIED PHARMACOLOGY 497 (1972). Other research reveals that animals exposed to
low levels of dioxin in laboratory tests actually lived longer than control animals. Boxenbaum et al.,
supra note 263, at 208. Hormetic effects have been observed for quite a variety of chemicals, including
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pesticides, animals receiving small intakes have been healthier than the
control animals.
270
The notion of hormesis remains scientifically controversial and has not
been conclusively "proved." But neither has the linear low dose extrapolation
model common to regulation been so proved.27' If hormesis applies, it will
not apply in the same manner to all substances. The evidence for some
hormetic effect is certainly reasonably strong in the context of regulatory
science. The FQPA's apparent devotion to ever lower pesticide exposures
could therefore have the paradoxical effect of lowering public health.
The above discussion focuses upon the specific paradoxes attendant to the
FQPA standards. More general effects might well result from features of the
law that are common to environmental regulation. For example, increased
time, resources, and attention devoted to the relatively minimal health effects
of pesticide residues could be drawn from greater environmental threats.
272
The added costs borne by producers and consumers will themselves cause
health harms and additional deaths, as these revenues become unavailable for
other health-protective expenditures. 3
Reduced pesticide usage will also have adverse consequences for the
natural environment While pesticides can themselves harm the environment
(e.g., by killing birds or nontarget insects), the natural benefits of pesticide
some pesticides. See e.g., Edward J. Calabrese et al., The Occurrence of Chemically Induced
Hormesis, 52 HEALTH PHYSICS 531 (1987).
270. Boxenbaum et al., supra note 263, at 209 (quoting D.E. Stevenson).
271. There is a tendency to subject hormesis to a higher standard of proof than required of the
conventional linearity model. Such differential standards of proof will be as paradoxical in effect as
different legal standards. See The Second Annual BELLE Conference: A Review, BELLE NEWSL. (U.
Mass. Sch. of Pub. Health, Amherst, Ma.), Aug. 1993, at 3 (discussing comments of John Graham of
Harvard School of Public Health to the effect that we must be even-handed in our standards of proof
for the non-threshold model as for hormesis); see also Cross, supra note 165, at 897 (noting that
existence of hormesis is not beyond dispute but that double standard in evaluating hormesis will cause
more harm to public health). For a variety of reasons, hormesis has been downplayed. See Edward J.
Calabrese, Expanding the RiD Concept to Incorporate and Optimize Beneficial Effects While
Preventing Toxic Responses from Non-Essential Toxicants, BELLE NEWSL., October 1995, at 7-8
(noting that disincentives to investigate hormetic effects include ideological bias, the need for larger
sample sizes to detect the relatively small effects, toxicological traditions, and biases in federal grants).
272. See, e.g., Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-
Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369 (1995) (more efficient allocation of federal regulatory resources
could save tens of thousands of lives); Cross, supra note 165, at 908-14 (discussing examples of
misallocation, including how undue attention to pesticide residues on food draws regulatory attention
from much greater hazards of microbial food contamination).
273. For an extensive review of the effects of reduced income on health harms, see Frank B.
Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q.
729 (1995); Susan L. Ettner, New Evidence on the Relationship Between Income and Health, 15 J.
HEALTH ECON. 49 (1996).
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applications are too often ignored. A reduction in pesticide usage probably
would result in increasing the acreage under cultivation. Much of this new
acreage would be on "marginal land and would increase erosion and
sedimentation, increase use of fertilizer and energy, and reduce wildlife
habitat."274 Many individuals do not realize that "traditional and organic
farmers suffer the highest rates of soil erosion per ton of food output."
275
IV. ESCAPING PERVERSE POLICIES UNDER FQPA
The only express statutory provision enabling escape from regulatory
actions that paradoxically increase risk is the exemption provision.
Unfortunately, this provision is closely bounded and does not expressly
permit consideration of adverse consequences as a basis for granting
exemptions. Relying on exemptions would strain the statute beyond
reasonable limits and surely fail a test of judicial review. Some of the
statutory perversities may be avoided through certain modified risk
assessment procedures. Such modifications are not necessarily dishonest
intellectually; risk assessment includes a considerable amount of "trans-
science," policy judgments not grounded in scientific evidence.276
Congress plainly stated that the FQPA "does not preclude EPA from
changing its risk assessment methodology as the science of risk assessment
evolves. 27 7 Adjusting risk assessment methodologies could mitigate some of
the paradoxical consequences of the law. Quantitative assessments of risks to
humans from pesticides are highly uncertain and depend upon a range of
assumptions. The presence of such debatable assumptions leaves
considerable discretion in the risk assessor.278
Given risk assessment discretion, government could modify its
assessment practices in order to reach more desirable results. Government
could employ more realistic, rather than conservative, assumptions in the
assessment. Such modifications are generally scientifically defensible.
Current approaches to risk assessment commonly use "conservative"
assumptions in order to ensure that the true risk could not be plausibly
274. See 1995 Hearings, supra note 31, at 177 (statement of Professor C. Robert Taylor).
275. Avery, supra note 194, at 74.
276. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1619-22 (addressing policy considerations of trans-science) & 1720-23 (1995) (listing National
Research Council's trans-scientific junctures in carcinogen risk assessment).
277. H.R. REP. No. 104-669, pt. 2, at 41 (1996).
278. See generally COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT (1994); COHRSSEN & COVELLO,
supra note 154; Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningul Environmental RiskAssessment, 19 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 409 (1995).
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understated by the assessment 79 Within the context of food safety decision
making, regulators use conservative default assumptions designed to produce
the largest plausible estimated risk.280 Yet a conservative approach to
addressing one risk may simply transfer and increase risks elsewhere, so that
apparent conservatism may in reality increase overall risk.281 Given the
paradoxes possible from overregulation of pesticide residues on food, it
makes more sense to obtain the most accurate assessment possible, without
seeking conservatism.
The risk assessment process involves several distinct steps. First is hazard
identification, a process through which a substance is identified as hazardous,
such as by finding it to be a carcinogen. The hazard identification process is
not highly conservative2 82 and often involves animal bioassays. In animal
bioassays, laboratory animals are dosed with a substance and then followed
for tumorigenicity. If the exposed animals have a statistically significant
greater number of tumors than control animals, this might be used as the
basis for finding the substance carcinogenic. The evidence is seldom
unambiguous, and EPA has used a scale of probable carcinogenicity for
various substances.283 This identification has a bias for positive findings,
though, and "uncertainties regarding the biological meaning of certain types
of tumors are usually resolved by assuming the worst plausible
interpretation."
284
Under the traditional Delaney Clause, a finding that a substance induced
279. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 172, at47 (suggesting that prevailing risk assessment practices
often overstate risks by "factors of a thousand or even a million or more"); Philip H. Abelson,
Exaggerated Risks of Chemicals, 48 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 173, 175 (1995) (concluding that risk
assessment overstates the true risk to human health by a factor ranging from one hundred to infinity);
Wagner, supra note 276, at 1629 n.55 (observing "agencies typically err on the side of more stringent
standards in order to be conservative"); L. Daniel Maxim, Problems Associated with the Use of
Conservative Assumptions in Exposure and Risk Analysis, in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 67, at 526 (surveying literature on use of conservative
assumptions).
280. See Joseph Rodricks & Michael R. Taylor, Application of Risk Assessment to Food Safety
Decision Making, in READINGS IN RISK 143, 150-51 (Theodore S. Glickman & Michael Gough eds.,
1990) (listing conservative default assumptions and noting that they will overstate risk by a
"substantial" amount "in many cases").
281. See generally Cross, supra note 165.
282. The requirement of statistical significance combats conservatism somewhat. However,
conservatism is introduced through EPA's methods of counting tumors, by including benign tumors
and pre-tumor neoplasms and estimation methods. Compared to the identified number, the "most
likely number of excess tumors is certainly lower, and may be zero[.]" Shere, supra note 278, at 435-
36.
283. See id. at 431-32 (explaining EPA scale). EPA's proposed changes in its Guidelines for
Carcinogen Risk Assessment would move away from this scale to a more simplified classification
scheme. 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,961 (1996).
284. See Rodricks & Taylor, supra note 280, at 150.
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cancer in laboratory animals was sufficient to invoke a prohibition. Under the
new "reasonable certainty" de mininis risk standard for residues, EPA must
obtain a quantitative estimate of cancer risk to humans. Seldom is actual
evidence of human risk available. Epidemiological studies have a variety of
methodological difficulties2 5 and, more profoundly, can detect only very
large increases in cancer rates. 6 A one in one million risk to be regulated by
the FQPA is not conceivably detectable epidemiologically. Quantitative risk
assessment, therefore, typically requires a dose-response assessment
extrapolation of the animal bioassay results and relies upon highly uncertain
assumptions to enable the extrapolation.
To obtain statistically significant evidence of carcinogenicity requires a
significant excess of tumors, which in turn often requires that very high doses
be given to laboratory animals. 8 7 Commonly, researchers use several dose
levels. These include a level called LD50, which corresponds to the level at
which fifty percent of the study animals will die from immediate acutely
toxic effects, or one called MTD (maximum tolerated dose), which is the
highest dose a species can tolerate without significant noncarcinogenic
effect.288  Such high level exposures may be required for a study's289
consideration by government. Yet MT exposures are uncertain guides to
inherent carcinogenicity of a substance because they may cause qualitative
changes in the subject animal or overwhelm self-defense mechanisms that
are effective at lower doses.2 °
285. Epidemiological studies conducted in the real world lack laboratory conditions. Hence it is
difficult to distinguish exposed populations and control for the interfering effects of other variables,
among other factors. See generally Michael Dore, A Proposed Standard for Evaluating the Use of
Epidemiological Evidence in Toxic Tort and Other Personal Injury Cases, 28 How. L.J. 667 (1985);
see also T.W. Fuhremann, Food Safety Assessment for Various Classes of Carcinogens, in PESTICIDE
RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 48, at 221, 222 (observing that "reliable human
epidemiology data is seldom available and that direct human testing is not possible").
286. See FRANK B. CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW 47 (1989)
(noting that epidemiology can detect only "gross increases" such as a 30% increase in cancer rates);
Dale Hattis & David Kennedy, Assessing Risks from Health Hazards: An Imperfect Science, in
READINGS IN RISK, supra note 280, at 156, 158 (noting that "the rates of specific illnesses from a
given hazard often must be increased several times above average before one can conclude that they
aren't simply random fluctuations").
287. See COHRSSEN & COVELLO, supra note 154, at 42 (noting that doses "in bioassays are
necessarily relatively high so as to increase the sensitivity of the experiments").
288. See id. at 39-42.
289. See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 5333, 5334 (1997)(rejecting consideration of negative study on
glufosinate ammonium because a "high enough dose was not tested").
290. See COHRSSEN & COVELLO, supra note 154, at 53; Abelson, supra note 279, at 176. Of the
substances found carcinogenic in animal tests, only one-third showed carcinogenicity at doses less
than the MTD. See id.; see also Maria E. Matteo, How Many Mice Must Die?, 7 TEMPLE ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 103, 109 (1988) (describing use of MTD and how doses lower than MTD but higher than
actual human exposure levels often yield negative doses).
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Once it is established that a certain high dose of a substance produces
statistically significant increases in tumors in certain laboratory animals
(generally rats or mice), the government must take those results and quantify
the increase expected for a lower exposure level in humans. When
experimental data yield conflicting results, the agency choses the set "which
will yield the highest estimate of low dose risk."291 This requires that
assumptions be made about two major factors-the translation of the animal
species to humans and the translation from a higher dose to a lower dose.
Both are quite debatable.
Translating results among species is complicated and requires some
simplifying assumptions. It is not even clear that such translations are
scientifically appropriate.292 The "rodent studies now used to predict human
risk were never intended for that purpose."2 93 Yet prevailing patterns of
conservatism require that the translation be made. In making the cross-
species analysis, a major problem derives from the disparate size of humans
and test animals. Relative doses require some size scaling, which might be
done by body weight, surface area, or by some other method. The choice
between these two methods is highly salient. Extrapolations based on surface
area rather than body weight may result in a tenfold increase in estimated
risk.
29 4
Other interspecies differences also require uncertain extrapolation.
295
Some interspecies differences call the entire process into question. For
example, one study found an elevated cancer rate from exposure to unleaded
291. See Rodricks & Taylor, supra note 280, at 150.
292. See, e.g., Aaron Wildavsky, Regulation of Carcinogens: Are Animal Tests a Sound
Foundation?, INDEP. REV. 29 (questioning reliance on such tests); Lester B. Lave et al., Information
Value of the Rodent Bioassay, 336 NATURE 631, 633 (1988) (suggesting that rodent bioassays "give
limited and uncertain information on carcinogenicity"); Abelson, supra note 279, at 176 (observing
that humans and rodents may "differ significantly in their modes of biochemical and physiological
disposition of chemicals"); COHRSSEN & COVELLO, supra note 154, at 42 (saying that "long-term
animal bioassays may not be completely reliable predictors of carcinogenicity in humans" and that at
least some earlier studies provide only "limited or inadequate evidence of carcinogenicity"). Many
substances are carcinogenic in rats but not mice, and vice versa. See id. The extrapolation is even more
complicated by a tendency to rely upon unusually sensitive test species in bioassays. See OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 16-17
(1991); see also Abelson, supra note 279, at 175 (questioning use of "inbred, obese rodents" as a proxy
for effects in humans).
293. Dennis J. Paustenbach, Health Risk Assessments: Opportunities and Pitfalls, 14 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 379,397 (1989).
294. See Arlene Yang, Standards and Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 523,
529 (1995).
295. See COHRSSEN & COVELLO, supra note 154, at 81 (observing that such extrapolations are
"highly uncertain because of differences in size, metabolism, anatomy, physiology, and population
heterogeneity").
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gasoline in male rats, but not female rats or mice. Further research disclosed
that the increase was due to the buildup in kidneys of a protein that is only
found in male rats, not in humans. 296 Yet another translation problem arises
because the routes of administration of the substance in test animals are often
different from the route of human exposure.297
With respect to the translation from a higher dose to a lower dose,
government agencies typically use some form of a linear model. 298 This
model assumes that tumors are proportionately lower with lower exposures,
but that there is no safe exposure level above zero.299 This model does not
consider the possibility of a threshold safe level or a hormetic effect at low
levels. Yet "there is no consistent scientific rationale for assuming a linear
relation between dose and response." 3°° The extrapolation is grounded in
malleable political policies rather than science.
Many linear models do not account for the biological mechanisms of
carcinogenesis. 30 1 Accounting for mechanisms can significantly change the
extrapolation. For example, carcinogens may be distinguished between those
that directly cause gene mutation or alternation, called genotoxic or initiators,
and those that may contribute to cell proliferation only after such damage has
already occurred, called epigenetic or nongenotoxic or promoters.30 2 The
case for linearity is stronger for the first set of substances, while epigenetic
effects are more likely to have a threshold.30 3 Agencies have historically
assumed that all carcinogens were genotoxic,3° though this presumption may
be changing. Even the mutagenic effects of genotoxic substances may
sometimes be attributed to the very high MTD level used in animal
296. See Wildavsky, supra note 292, at 35; CENTER FOR RISK ANALYSIS, HARVARD SCHOOL OF
PUBLIC HEALTH, A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
43 (1994). A more common problem arises when substances cause cancer in the zymbal gland of the
rat, because humans have no such gland. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 292, at
19.
297. CROSS, supra note 286, at 43.
298. See Wildavsky, supra note 292, at 37 (noting that "[t]he regulatory response is that the dose-
response relationship is linear"). Federal agencies are currently easing away from an automatic
presumption of linearity, but such models remain the default choice, used in most instances.
299. See Rodricks & Taylor, supra note 280, at 150 (reporting that agencies "select mathematical
models for high-to-low dose extrapolations that yield the highest prediction of risk at low doses").
300. BREYER, supra note 172, at 44.
301. See Wildavsky, supra note 292, at 36-39 (noting the lack of biological explanation for
extrapolation models).
302. See discussion in Wildavsky, supra note 292, at 40-41; Matteo, supra note 290, at 107.
303. Wildavsky, supra note 292, at 41 (suggesting threshold for nongenotoxic substances);
CENTER FOR RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 296, at 43 (same).
304. See Rodricks & Taylor, supra note 280, at 150 (noting that [a]gencies assume all carcinogens
act by the same mechanism (genotoxicity), which is the mechanism that predicts the greatest risk at
low dose").
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bioassays.0
Some substances may be carcinogenic only because they produce certain
metabolic changes in the body. These metabolic changes may be dose-
dependent, which would mean that there was a safe threshold below which
the substance was not carcinogenic. 30 6 Regulatory policy, though, "assumes
all [carcinogens] to be of the riskiest kind," which "seems odd, given all we
have read about the important mechanistic distinctions among toxicants of
this class, and the possibility of sublinear or even thresholds in the dose-
response curves of some of them."307 EPA's proposed changes in its
Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment admit the relevance of metabolic
and pharmacokinetic data, but still have a default presumption of linearity.08
The risk assessment of a substance culminates with some measure of
abstract carcinogenic potency. To ascertain actual human risk, EPA also
requires some measure of human exposure to the substance. These exposure
assessments are frequently as conservative as the potency assessments.
Exposure assessments typically employ unrealistic assumptions and may
presume that an individual remains exposed consistently to the maximum
possible level throughout an entire seventy-year lifetime.309
Exposure assessments for pesticides commonly are based on the
"maximum amount of pesticide which could be ingested. ' 310 For example,
regulators may "[a]ssume a person consumes food at a very high rate (90th
percentile of consumers of that food) and that every mouthful for a whole
lifetime contains a pesticide residue at the maximum allowed
concentration." 31' When EPA checked its theoretical risk assessment for the
pesticide captan against real world data, the agency discovered that the
former assessment overestimated exposure by a hundredfold.312 Other
305. Bruce N. Ames & Lois Swirsky Gold, Too Many Rodent Carcinogens: Mitogenesis
Increases Mutagenesis, 249 SCIENCE 970, 870 (1990).
306. See CENTER FOR RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 296, at 42 (noting that consideration of
pharmacokinetic information on substances can suggest propriety of non-linear extrapolation of risk).
307. RODRICKS, supra note 175, at 189. See id. at 145-57 for a discussion of such mechanistic
differences.
308. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 17,960, 17,968.
309. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 292, at 22-23; see also BREYER, supra
note 172, at 46 (describing unrealistic assumptions in exposure assessment for groundwater exposure);
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 296, at
38 (finding that government exposure scenarios are "hypothetical and arbitrary"). When setting a
tolerance for carboxin under the FQPA, EPA considered the unrealistic Theoretical Maximum Residue
Contribution which assumes that all foods have the maximum concentration. See 62 Fed. Reg. 4911,
4913 (1997). However, the agency went on to express a willingness to consider more accurate
measures of actual exposure if available. See id.
310. RODGERS, supra note 56, at § 5.21(C).
311. RODRICKS, supra note 175, at 190.
312. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 292, at 23.
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assumptions similarly tend to overstate actual exposure to pesticide
residues.313 As discussed above, typical actual exposures are far below
permissible tolerances.
Changes in risk assessment extrapolation judgments could produce a
substantial effect on estimated risks and corresponding levels of "reasonable
certainty that no harm will resulf' (one-in-one-million risk of cancer).
Changing conservative assumptions to most-likely-estimate assumptions will
produce risk assessments that allow greater pesticide usage. Indeed, changing
the assumptions can potentially alter risk estimates by a factor of 100,000 or
more.
3 14
While the variations in quantitative risk assessment estimates are often
overstated as a practical matter, much lower alterations, say a factor of two,
would have a very practical significance on pesticide residue tolerance levels.
Such a modification could help avert the overregulation of pesticides based
on fears of food residues, thereby ameliorating the paradoxical health
consequences.
The risk assessment approaches discussed above might mitigate the
perverse paradoxes of pesticide regulation, but these approaches are highly
imperfect, indirect solutions to the problems. Some paradoxes, such as the
hormetic paradox, could be cured largely through improved risk assessment
methodologies. Others, such as the benefits and farmworker paradoxes might
be ameliorated-less overall regulation would permit more benefits and
require less risk-shifting to workers. But such amelioration would be only
coincidental and fortuitous.315 Because risk assessment fixes do not confront
the tradeoffs of the paradoxes themselves, changes in assessment represent a
partial solution and may perversely prevent society from confronting the
reality of such tradeoffs.
V. SENSIBLE AND SAFE PESTICIDE REGULATION
The need for government regulation of pesticide residues is not terribly
313. See Tomerlin & Engler, supra note 160, at 198. For example, the assessments assume "that
all foods presumed to contain residues of the pesticide are eaten at one sitting" and that pesticide
residues are uniformly distributed. See id.
314. See Yang, supra note 294, at 553.
315. Optimal results might not depend on happenstance, as regulators might adapt risk assessment
assumptions to reach the desired result in each case. This effect is by no means unknown in
environmental regulation. See Wagner, supra note 276, at 1645 n.107 (observing that regulators use
risk assessment to legitimate their prior choices). Such an approach suffers from dishonesty and
inconsistency, however, which can make regulatory decisions vulnerable on appeal to courts.
Moreover, the science can be stretched only so far, and even premeditated, strategic use of risk
assessment cannot guarantee a justification for optimal decisions.
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strong. The common case for environmental regulation rests on the concept
of externalities. For example, air pollution is nearly free to the polluter but
imposes potentially significant costs on others, who have very little
opportunity to control the pollution through the free market.316 While
pesticides also have negative externalities, agricultural producers themselves
bear much of the cost of pesticide applications, giving them ample incentive
to reduce usage when unnecessary. 3 17 Moreover, when discussing residues in
food, consumers who prefer to avoid the risk can do so by purchasing
organic produce at higher cost.318 Those who prefer lower cost fruits and
vegetables may accept a risk from pesticide residues. Theory suggests that
negative externalities are therefore slight, and evidence indicates that this is
indeed the case. Considerable experience demonstrates the market incentives
for reducing any pesticide risk.319 Because pesticides "account for 0.01% of
the total carcinogens" in food, the case for regulation is not strong.320
There remains, however, some case for regulating pesticide residues.32'
Extremely low prevailing risk levels may be in part due to the existence of
regulation. A useful pesticide might prove highly hazardous to consumers,
even at low residue levels. Such consumers cannot be expected to take the
time to conduct research necessary to protect themselves from the hazard.
316. While Coase taught us that those who breathe air pollution theoretically might combine and
contract with polluters to reduce emissions, the transaction costs of such action make it highly
unrealistic.
317. See, e.g., G. Schuhmann, The Economic Impact of Pesticides on Advanced Countries, in
PESTICIDES AND HUMAN WELFARE, supra note 177, at 55, 61 (observing that "[s]o far as the farmer is
concerned his input of pesticides must be justified by the increased value of his crop"). This
internalization of costs of pesticide applications is not perfect. Absent common law liability, producers
do not bear the external costs of disease from residue on foods. However, because the amount of
residue roughly tracks the amount of pesticide applied, producers have an indirect incentive to control
residues.
318. William Rodgers argues that consumers have no meaningful way to escape pesticides on
food, but does not mention why the presence of certifiably organic produce does not provide such
choice. RODGERS, supra note 56, at § 5.2 1(A).
319. See Perry J. Gehring, Risk Management in the Absence of Credible Risk Assessment, in
PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 48, at 267, 274:
Newer pesticides are being developed with use rates a thousand times less, and these pesticides are
more selective to the target and have less capability to move to unwanted sites. Users of pesticides
are being trained and licensed. Delivery systems are being developed that reduce exposure to the
users, reduce the risk of environmental contamination, and minimize the chance of over-
application. Industry, government and academia are cooperating to elucidate more efficient,
targeted pesticide application that maximizes the desired effect while minimizing potential
adverse risks to health and the environment.
Id.
320. Green Mountain Institute, supra note 152, at 14.
321. The Green Mountain Institute for Environmental Democracy concluded that "low levels of
concern" for pesticides in food were warranted, given the large exposed population and the possibility
of tolerance violations. See Green Mountain Institute, supra note 152, at 13.
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Requiring each individual to self-inform would be less efficient than the use
of government regulation. While some pesticide residue regulation can be
justified, the relative weakness of the justification means that regulation
might readily become counterproductive; government should therefore
proceed carefully.
Sane regulation of pesticides, in order to avoid perverse paradoxes, must
incorporate two important principles. First, standards must be consistent
throughout the various risks presented by the chemicals.322 Otherwise, there
will be a systematic tendency to shift risks from areas of tougher standards to
areas where standards are more lax. Differential standards readily permit not
only a transfer of risk but an increase in overall risk. The risk increase and
transfer attributable to differential standards also will tend to injure already
disadvantaged groups, such as farm-workers and the poor.
Second, standards must consider the benefits of pesticide applications.
Pesticide use produces positive externalities to human health.
Environmentalists have long resisted such benefit considerations, because
benefits were expressed as economic gains to producers or manufacturers,
and were used to justify risks to health.32 3 But the critical benefits of
pesticides are not the financial ones but those related to human health.324
Pesticides provide considerable health benefits by combatting or indirectly
reducing exposure to natural toxins and by assisting the production of low
cost fruits and vegetables. The case for excluding consideration of such
health benefits is hard to imagine. When the statutory goal is public health
protection, the law should not direct actions that undermine health.
Of course, the popular perception of pesticides as chemical invaders of
our health lies at the root of paradoxical regulatory pursuits. 325 Given the
public fears and predilections, it is not surprising that Congress compromised
on a stringent regulatory approach for pesticide residues, notwithstanding the
paradoxical health consequences of that approach. But we need not be
prisoners of public misperceptions.326 Administrative tinkering with
assessment methodologies can alleviate the paradoxical risks created by the
322. See Curme, supra note 30, at 626 (discussing how inconsistent standards result in higher
risks of cancer).
323. In practice, EPA's cost/benefit balancing has focused on the calculation of monetary losses to
growers and not the costs or foregone benefits to consumers. See Cropper et al., supra note 16, at 194.
324. For a discussion of this distinction, see RODGERS, supra note 56, at § 5.22(B)(3).
325. See Furtick, supra note 177, at I 1 (observing that much of the concern over pesticide
exposures "is derived from people who have unfounded fear about all synthetic chemicals who seek to
consume or come into contact with only 'natural' substances").
326. See Cross, supra note 260, generally and at 955-58 (recommending measures to focus risk
regulation on scientific estimates rather than public misperceptions).
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FQPA, but cannot do so in a principled manner and cannot eliminate those
risks. Government needs to recognize a new paradigm for pesticide
regulation that incorporates the considerable benefits attendant to pesticides
and recognizes the risks associated with reckless regulation. The FQPA made
some advances (adding consistency for raw and produced foods, directing
more attention toward past registered pesticides rather than dwelling on new
products), but the Act failed to address more serious paradoxes and its
enhancement of regulatory stringency could greatly exacerbate those
paradoxes.
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